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I. INTRODUCTION
The 1980s is appropriately considered the Golden Age of Delaware
corporate law.' During that era, the Delaware courts won international
attention, not just by erecting the legal pillars that frame today's corporate
governance discourse, but by interjecting a fresh perspective on the rights
of owners and the prerogatives of managers. Within a melodious chorus
of great decisions are four cases we refer to as the "Golden Quartet," which
fundamentally changed Delaware's judicial review of important recurring
questions that both delineate the obligations of managers and define the
owner-manager relationship: Revlon v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holding,

' The lasting effect of the landmark decisions, regarding corporate issues coming out of
Delaware's courts during this period, was readily apparent and recognized, even as the state's
jurisprudence was developing. See, e.g., Takeover Turmoil Represents Law's 'Golden Age,'
Corporate Counsel Told, 17 SEC. REG. & L. REP., Oct. 18, 1985, at 1831 (quoting Bayliss
Manning, the former Dean of Stanford Law School, describing the mid-1980's as a "golden age
of corporate law").
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Inc. ("Revlon"); 2 Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co. ("Unocal"); 3
Weinberger v. UOP, Inc. ("Weinberger"); 4 and Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas
Corp. ("Blasius").5 From inception each of the cases was rightly viewed
as creating vigorous fiduciary responsibilities for directors and officers to
act in the best interests of their company's shareholders.
No student emerges from a law school's business organization class
today without a deep familiarity with these Delaware precedents. Yet, as
is often the case with the common law, the meaning of these cases has
evolved over time. Changes in the world of corporate governance have
affected directors' and officers' roles in the modern corporation, including
the rise of the independent director,6 the increased concentration of the
shareholder ownership stakes,' and the development of hedge fund
activism,' to name a few.
One particularly critical development has been the recent explosion
of disclosure-related deal litigation. In the past few years, more than 96%
of publicly disclosed mergers have attracted shareholder litigation in a
wide variety of venues. 9 Faced with this avalanche of cases, Delaware has
struggled to find ways to reduce the flood to a trickle. In a fit of radical
innovation, forum selection bylaws designed to funnel these cases back to
the Delaware courts have been developed with strong initial judicial
support that ultimately culminated in broad legislative authority. o Once
the mechanics for adopting those unilaterally board-approved bylaws were
in place, the Delaware Court of Chancery announced in In re Trulia that it
2 Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holding, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986)
(addressing the scope of protection of shareholders in sale of control transactions).
Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985) (embracing a twostep, process-oriented test that management must meet when defending control against an
unwanted suitor).
4 Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983) (en banc) (establishing the
template for examining self-dealing acquisitions).
' Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651 (Del. Ch. 1988) (examining the
foundations of the director-shareholder relationship).
6Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise oflndependent Directorsin the United States, 1950-2005:
Of Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1465, 1468 (2007) ("The
move to independent directors, which began as a 'good governance' exhortation, has become in
some respects a mandatory element of corporate law.").
7 Bernard S. Black, ShareholderPassivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REv. 520, 523-24
(1990) (discussing how a "shareholder voice holds more promise for process and structural
issues than for company-specific concerns.").
8 Alon Bray et al., Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate Governance, and Firm
Performance, 63 J. OF FIN. 1729, 1730 (2008) (discussing how "hedge funds are better
positioned to act as informed monitors than other institutional investors" such as mutual funds
and pension funds).
' Matthew D. Cain et al., The Shifiing Tides of Merger Litigation, 71 VAND. L. REv.

603, 604 (2018).
"0 James D. Cox, CorporateLaw and the Limits ofPrivate Ordering, 93 WASH. U. L.
REv. 257, 257-58 (2015).
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would no longer approve disclosure-only settlements without a strong
showing by the plaintiff of plainly material nondisclosures or omissions."
The flood of disclosure-only cases quickly dropped to more manageable
levels, although there was some evidence of flight to the federal courts. 12
But even as these important roadblocks to shareholder deal
litigation were being erected, as developed below, the Delaware courts
have persisted in temporizing, in important ways, the scope of the Golden
Quartet of cases that so defined the 1980s. Even though they still shape
all manner of corporate discourse, this article shows that these cases have
been hollowed out by the recent jurisprudence of the Delaware Supreme
Court. As developed more fully below, central to the judicial constrictions
of Revlon, Weinberger, Unocaland Blasius is the obeisance the Delaware
Supreme Court repeatedly accorded to what it believes are the natural
disciplining forces of informed shareholder consent and competitive
markets for corporate control.13 As will be developed later, this growing
deference has coincided with the rise of hedge fund activist investors.
Despite these considerations, we offer other explanations for why each of
the components of the Golden Quartet have been substantially muted. 14
Should we applaud these changes or wring our hands in despair?
While some commentators have applauded these judicial moves, arguing
that private enforcement of these fiduciary duties has run amok," others
have pointed out that these cutbacks will weaken shareholder monitoring
of corporate management and potentially increase the incidence of director

In re Trulia, Inc. Stockholder Litig., 129 A.3d 884, 887 (Del. Ch. 2016).
12 Cain et al., supra note 9, at 608.
13 In future work, we intend to focus on the strengths and weaknesses of shareholder

ratification votes and their appropriate role as a monitoring device. In particular, we will explore
the problems inherent in bundled votes when the shareholders are asked to approve a transaction
simultaneously with approval of potential director misconduct as well as the overall rationale
for shareholder ratification.
" A related paper by one of the authors is Steven Davidoff Solomon & Randall S.
Thomas, The Rise andFall ofDelaware'sTakeover Standards, forthcoming in THE CORPORATE
CONTRACT IN CHANGING TIMEs: IS THE LAW KEEPING UP? (Steven Davidoff Solomon and
Randall S. Thomas eds., University of Chicago Press 2018). Another related recent working
paper by Professor Korsmo discusses some of the issues related to the changes made to the
Revlon and Weinberger doctrines. Charles R. Korsmo, Corwin v. KKR and the Retreat of
JudicialScrutiny ofMergers (Working Paper 2017). Professor Korsmo concludes that business
judgment review is not warranted under these doctrines when a merger has been approved by
independent directors and a stockholder vote. Id. at 6.
s See Sean J. Griffith, Correcting the Corporate Benefit: How to Fix Shareholder
Litigation by Shifting the Doctrine on Fees, 56 B.C. L. REv. 1 (2015); Theodore N. Mirvis,
Delaware Court Guidance on Merger Litigation Settlements, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP.
GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Jan. 26, 2016), [https://perma.ccl3NVB-DFB6] (discussing the
implications ofln re Trulia).
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misconduct.16
In this article, we seek to take a middle roadacknowledging that the Delaware courts are weakening judicial and
shareholder oversight of directors' and officers' fiduciary duties, while
also recognizing important substantive issues not fully considered in each
of the members of the Golden Quartet such that correction or restraint
naturally followed in the years of their application. Moreover, such
correction was to be expected in light of the growing presence of
institutional activism and those shareholders' use of Institutional
Shareholder Services as a third party voting advisor service. Shareholder
monitoring can occur in a variety of ways, and the current vitality of hedge
fund activism-some would say excessively so-may provide a good
justification for weakening the mechanisms for investor monitoring via
litigation. 17 However, should Delaware move to restrict hedge fund
activism, we would have to revisit the need for stronger shareholder
litigation in order to insure adequate shareholder monitoring of corporate
management.
We proceed as follows: the initial four parts of the article examine
how the bite of each of the Golden Quartet has been seriously defanged
overtime. In the fifth part, we explore explanations unique to each of the
cases constituting the Golden Quartet that will likely show why the
Delaware courts have chosen to retreat from the ground claimed in the
1980s. Part I examines the evolving content of Revlon. We document the
shifts over time in the meaning of judicial review under this standard,
showing how its expansive beginnings in two bidder cases led to its
overuse in one bidder transactions. This in turn led the Delaware courts
to cut back on the doctrine. Nonetheless, as developed below, the
Delaware Supreme Court's most recent evisceration of Revlon in Corwin
v. KKR FinancialHoldings, LLC, " portends a shift in corporate law that
is more momentous than was Revlon itself.
Weinberger's degradation is examined in Part II. Again, a pattern
of expanding shareholder litigation seems to have pushed the Delaware
courts to cut back on the scope of judicial review. The Delaware Supreme
Court's decision in Kahn v. M&F Worldwide' 9 surely accomplished that
goal but we point out the costs associated with that opinion.20

6 See Joel Edan Friedlander, Vindicating the Duty of Loyalty: Using Data Points of
Successful Litigation as a Toolfor Reform, 72 BUS. LAW. 632 (2017).
" See e.g., Leo E. Strine, Jr., Who Bleeds When the Wolves Bite?: A Flesh-and-Blood
Perspectiveon Hedge FundActivism and our Strange CorporateGovernance System, 126 YALE
L. J. 1870, 1883 (2017).
Corwin v. KKR Fin. Holdings, LLC, 125 A.3d 304 (Del. 2015) (en banc).
1 Kahn v. M&F Worldwide, 88 A.3d 635 (Del. 2014) (M&F-Il) (en banc).
20
See infra Part 1.
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Unocal's weakening is the focus of Part III where the Delaware
Supreme Court initially appeared to be filling an important regulatory gap
in the market for corporate control, but ultimately rejected the legal
standard set forth in City CapitalAssociates Ltd. Partnershipv. Interco,
Inc. ("Interco") that would have given shareholders a choice in deciding
whether to tender into a hostile takeover. 2 1 Backtracking furiously, the
court has now intentionally withdrawn almost completely from any role in
regulating the market for corporate control in favor of judicial deference
to independent directors' decisions.
Among the Golden Quartet, Blasius had the greatest potential for a
much needed rethinking of boundaries between shareholder rights and
management prerogatives. However, as set forth in Part IV, among the
four areas studied here, Blasius had the shortest life, perhaps reflecting the
potential profundity of its insights. In Part V we explain the multiple
forces that contributed to the now weak-to-nonexistent voice of the Golden
Quartet. We conclude that existing market forces and shareholder
oversight are sufficient to curtail managerial misconduct but that the
watchful eye of judicial review may need to be revived if those vehicles
for shareholder oversight are curtailed.
II. REVLON AND CORWIN: WHAT'S LEFT OF JUDICIAL REVIEW OF
DIRECTOR FIDUCIARY DUTIES IN A SALE OF CONTROL?

Revlon is a corporate law icon standing for the broad proposition
that, in Delaware, and about half the jurisdictions presented with similar
issues, the board of directors has the burden of proving their independent
and good faith pursuit of the best offer whenever control of the company
is being sold.22 As so stated, the board does not enjoy the same deference
courts regularly accord to director decisions regarding the company's
affairs for which there is a high presumption of propriety embodied in the
business judgment rule.23 In this section, we trace the major developments

21 City Capital Assocs. Ltd. P'ship v. Interco, Inc., 551 A.2d 787 (Del. Ch. 1988).
22

See Michal Barzuza, The State ofStateAntitakeoverLaw, 95 VA. L. REv. 1973, 201218 (2009) (collecting cases following and diverging from Delaware law on takeover-related
issues).
23 See Unocal Corp.,493 A.2d at 953-54 ("From this it is now well established that in
the acquisition of its shares a Delaware corporation may deal selectively with its stockholders,
provided the directors have not acted out of a sole or primary purpose to entrench themselves in
office."); see also Hanson Trust PLC, v. ML SCM Acquisition, Inc., 781 F.2d 264, 273 (2d Cir.
1986) ("[I]n other jurisdictions, directors may not enjoy the same presumptions per the
business judgment rule.").
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in the Revlon doctrine. In recent decisions, we find that Revlon's bark is
today greatly muffled and its bite largely nonexistent.
A. Revlon Creates a New StandardofReview
Revlon was a conglomerate company run by an urbane and
sophisticated Frenchman, Michel Bergerac.24 Its suitor, Ronald Perelman,
backed by Drexel Burnham's newly created junk bond financing
juggernaut, attempted to initiate a friendly transaction, but was "rebuffed,
perhaps in part based on Mr. Bergerac's strong personal antipathy to Mr.
Perelman." 2 5 Perelman responded by launching a hostile tender offer for
Revlon, which in turn implemented a poison pill and a defensive stock
repurchase. 26 The stock repurchase efforts involved an issuance of notes
in exchange for shares of the company's stock.27 Among the notes'
protective provisions were serious limitations on Revlon incurring
additional debt; however, a majority of the independent directors on the
Revlon board could waive these provisions.28
Perelman made a series of escalating bids and eventually the Revlon
board entered into an MBO with the Forstmann Little leveraged buyout
firm (joined by some of Revlon's senior management) at a price of $56
cash per share.2 9 Perelman raised his tender offer price to $56.25 in
response to the Forstmann Little bid.30 Forstmann Little and Revlon then
made a new deal at $57.25 cash per share, conditioned on Revlon agreeing
to three deal protections: a crownjewel lock-up, a $25 million cancellation
fee and a no-shop provision."1 As part of this deal, Forstmann Little agreed
to support the value of the notes whose value had plummeted after the
announcement of its initial MBO.32 Perelman then raised his bid to $58
cash per share and filed suit to enjoin the deal protections.
The Delaware Supreme Court approved Revlon's initial use of its
defensive tactics, pointing out that they benefited shareholders by forcing
Perelman to raise his bid and keeping him from buying the company at an
inadequate price and then busting it up.34 However, once Revlon's board
authorized its management team "to negotiate a merger or buyout with a
24 506 A.2d 173, 175-76 (Del. 1986).
25
Id. at 176.
26 id.
2
Id. at 177.
28
Id. at 178.
29

3o Id.

Id.
Id. at 178-79.
33
Id. at 179.
3Id. at 181.
31
32
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third party ... [it] was a recognition that the company was for sale." 35 The
Revlon court reasoned that because the company was being sold in a bustup transaction that rendered the use of defensive tactics moot, as "the
directors' role changed from defenders of the corporate bastion to
auctioneers charged with getting the best price for the stockholders at a
sale of the company." 3 6 As a result, the court determined that it needed to
engage in enhanced scrutiny of any preferential treatment given by Revlon
to Forstmann Little and that scrutiny was to be guided by whether
Revlon's board acted as "auctioneers" in the sense of pursuing the best
offer. 37
In the Delaware Supreme Court's decision, the court noted that at
trial, the Court of Chancery was troubled that the facts strongly supported
the view that the Revlon directors favored Forstmann Little because they
feared personal liability to the note holders that participated in the stock
repurchase.3 8 Upon announcement of Forstmann Little's offer and the
Revlon's board's waiver of the notes' provision restricting additional debt,
the notes lost value. 39 The note holders therefore sued the directors
alleging fraud in the notes' issuance; the gravamen of their complaint is
that the board failed to disclose the high likelihood that the board would
seek another bidder and would waive the notes various protective
provisions to obtain the cooperation of its White Knight.40
There was also a whiff of management self-interest arising from the
officers' planned participation in the initial MBO offer and the obvious
animosity between Bergerac and Perelman. 4 1 With the scent of managerial
conflict of interest in the air, the court went on to conclude that when
"dissolution of the company becomes inevitable, the directors cannot
fulfill their enhanced . .. duties by playing favorites with the contending
factions. 4 2 Furthermore, the court said that "under all the circumstances
the directors allowed considerations other than the maximization of
shareholder profit to affect their judgment.'4 3 Therefore, the court struck

3 Id. at 182. The management team initially negotiated to join with Forstmann Little in
an MBO transaction that would have similarly resulted in a bust-up of the company. Id. at 178.
" Id. at 182.
37

id.

38 Id. at 179 (citing MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc. v. Revlon, Inc., 501 A.2d
1239, 1249-50 (Del. Ch. 1985), affd 505 A.2d 454 (Del. 1985) (decision without published
opinion)).
39
Id. at 177.
40Id. at 183.
41 Id.
42

1Id. at 184.
Id. at 185.

43
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down the three deal protections the Revlon board had provided Forstmann
Little."
At its inception, Revlon imposed a heightened degree of judicial
scrutiny on boards of directors; albeit in a case that involved two bidders,
where the company put itself up for sale and in the aftermath of that
decision discriminated unfairly between the competing bidders for the
company. Importantly, Revlon embraces the standard that the objective of
the board is to obtain the best offer reasonably available for the
shareholders. 45 The court's decision in the case nonetheless appears to
have been influenced by the directors' perceived conflicts of interest in
favoring Forstmann Little. Finally, the case left open important questions
about when the court would apply this new doctrine and how directors
would need to behave when it did apply. Subsequently, these issues were
addressed in other two bidder cases.
B. Revlon's Reach and Duties Are Clarified
Since Revlon was decided, there have been hundreds of cases where
the Delaware courts have considered its application. Given the wealth of
case law interpreting Revlon, it is difficult to isolate the crucial turning
points in the doctrine. While there is certainly plenty of room to debate
the fine points, almost everyone agrees that ParamountCommunications,
Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc. ("QVC") was a key decision in the evolution of
Delaware's Revlon jurisprudence.4 6
QVC involved an attempt by Paramount Communications, Inc.
("Paramount") to engage in a friendly merger with Viacom, Inc.
("Viacom") and its controlling shareholder Sumner Redstone. 47 After
extensive negotiations, Paramount and Viacom reached agreement on the
terms of an $8 billion dollar cash and stock merger that included some
formidable deal protections, including an uncapped stock option that
permitted Viacom to purchase 19.9% of Paramount's stock.48 However,
shortly after the deal was publicly announced, QVC Network made an
unsolicited proposal to buy Paramount at a significantly higher price; its
offer was subject to, among other things, the elimination of the deal

44Id.

45 See id. at 184 ("[T]he shareholders' interests necessitated that the board remain free
to negotiate in the fulfillment of that duty.").
4 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1993).
47 Id. at 36. Paramount had been searching for a merger partner ever since its earlier
unsuccessful effort to buy Time, Inc. in a hostile transaction. See generally Paramount
Commc's, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989).
48 QVC, 637 A.2d at 39.
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protections in the Paramount-Viacom merger.4 9 In each one of the
subsequent rounds of bidding, Paramount's board favored Viacom's bids;
ultimately the Delaware Supreme Court was called upon to determine the
validity of the deal protections.50
The threshold issue addressed by the court is what "triggers" Revlon
duties.51 In an earlier decision, the court had offhandedly approved the
"change of control" litmus. 52 In QVC, the court applied that test to hold
that a stock-for-stock merger that leads to the creation of a post-deal
controlling shareholder in the newly merged companies constitutes a
Revlon sale of control. 53
Having found that the initial proposed Paramount-Viacom merger
constituted just such a sale of control, the court went on to impose
important fiduciary obligations on Paramount's directors that were subject
to enhanced Revlon scrutiny in a two-part analysis. The court stated:
The key features of an enhanced [Revlon] scrutiny test are:
(a) a judicial determination regarding the adequacy of the
decisionmaking process employed by the directors, including
the information on which the directors based their decision;
and (b) a judicial examination of the reasonableness of the
directors' action in light of the circumstances then existing.
The directors have the burden of proving that they were
adequately informed and acted reasonably. 4
The court further specified the directors' specific obligations under the
first part of this test a few pages further into the opinion:
[T]he Paramount directors had the obligation: (a) to be
diligent and vigilant in examining the Paramount-Viacom
transaction and the QVC tender offers; (b) to act in good faith;
(c) to obtain, and act with due care on, all material information
reasonably available, including information necessary to
compare the two offers to determine which of these
transactions, or an alternative course of action, would provide
the best value reasonably available to the stockholders; and
49

1Id. at 3 8.
'o See id. at 36.
' See id. at 47.
52 Paramount Commc's Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 828 (Del. 1993)

(unpublished table decision), aff'g 635 A.2d 1245 (Del. Ch. 1993).
QVC, 637 A.2d at 48.
4
$ Id. at 45.
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(d) to negotiate actively and in good faith with both Viacom
and QVC to that end."
Applying this test to the facts of the case, the court concluded that
the Paramount directors had breached their fiduciary duties in conducting
the sale process; the court therefore affirmed the lower court order that
enjoined all the deal protections given to Viacom.56 The directors were
faulted for not giving sufficient attention to the impact of the "draconian"
deal protections in the original merger agreement and for not attempting
to negotiate away those obstacles to the sale process at subsequent points
in the negotiations with Viacom.57
QVC clarified how Revlon defines change of control transactions.
It also clarified that, in at least the two bidder setting, when a sale occurs,
the acquired company's directors' actions are subject to enhanced scrutiny
and adjudged against the best offer criterion. Two bidder cases, however,
typically are decided on motions for preliminary injunctions and do not
generally involve post-closing damage actions. This is important because
in an injunction setting, the duty of care operates freely without the
constraints of exculpatory provisions in corporate charters pursuant to
section 102(b)(7) of the Delaware General Corporation Law (the
"DGCL").
Furthermore, many of the two bidder cases involve extreme
favoritism of one bidder over another bidder, favoritism that often appears
motivated by obvious and not so obvious conflicts of interest such as
existed in Revlon. In other words, two bidder cases present a full range of
duty of care and duty of loyalty issues for a court to decide, making them
a potential rich area for mining under traditionally defined fiduciary
doctrines of care and loyalty. However, two-bidder contests, such as arose
in Revlon and QVC, are quite rare.
C. The Fracturingof Revlon in One Bidder Cases: Lyondell, Corwin and
C&J Energy Services
The Revlon doctrine was created and its broadest commands were
developed in two bidder cases. However, because two bidder cases arise
infrequently, and Revlon has, thus far, not been limited to such instances,
5

1Id. at 48.
" Id. at 5 1.
7

Id. at 50.

tit. 8 §, 102(b)(7) (authorizing articles of incorporation to include
provisions that shield directors from liability except in certain purposeful misconduct).
5 One important exception is Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261
(Del. 1988), where the Delaware Supreme Court clarified the boundaries of target companies'
differential treatment of competing bidders.
5 DEL. CODE
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Revlon's daily fare is the more common single bidder cases. In these
cases, Revlon complaints abound where the target company has entered
into a friendly transaction, with significant deal protections attached and
no other bidders sought to top the initial deal with a higher competing
offer. Many one bidder deals involve cash for stock deals with the
consequential effect that they constitute a change of control transactions
under Revlon. Pre-sale auctions, where a company solicits bids from a
large number of potential bidders, but ultimately chooses only a single
bidder, routinely result in an agreement that includes significant deal
protections that may deter alternative bids. Such transactions also trigger
Revlon even though they rarely involve a post-auction second bidder or
even the hint of a such a bidder.
In this setting, it is often difficult for a plaintiff to pursue the
directors individually because most Delaware corporations have
exculpatory provisions under section 102(b)(7) of the DGCL that
eliminate a director's money damage liability for breach of the duty of
care. Thus, even the most flagrant breaches of the duty of care will only
provide grounds for injunctive relief against target firm directors under
Revlon?" Since these cases generally wind up as post-closing damage
actions, as illustrated below, duty of care claims typically drop out of
them.6
Duty of loyalty claims held more promise until the Delaware
Supreme Court issued its opinion in Lyondell Chemical Co. v. Ryan.62 In
that case, a strategic bidder made an unsolicited all cash bid for Lyondell
Chemical. 3 In the course of one week, the Lyondell board negotiated and
agreed to a sale of the company after a small number of meetings, a
relatively cursory effort to extract a higher bid, and without making any
effort to seek an alternative transaction.6" In the end, the board agreed to
6 Beyond the protection of the immunity shield are advisors, such as investment
bankers, who can incur liability as aiders and abettors. See In re Del Monte Foods Co. S'holder
Litig., 25 A.3d 813 (Del. Ch. 2011) (granting a preliminary injunction against deal protection
provisions after finding substantial likelihood that transaction's advisor had engaged repeatedly
in prejudicial misconduct). As the preliminary injunction was winding down, the parties settled

the matter in one of the largest settlements in the history of Delaware. In re Del Monte Foods
Co. S'holder Litig., No. 6027-VCL, 2011 WL 6008590 (Del. Ch. Dec. 1, 2011) (Order and Final
Judgment).
6" While injunctive relief may be initially sought in these cases, there is no competing
offer on the table and hence the Court of Chancery is reluctant to enjoin the bid out of concern
that the target shareholders will lose the only offer on the table. Thus, these cases ultimately
become post-closing damage actions.
62 970 A.2d 235 (Del. 2009) (en banc).
63
Id. at 237-38.
4Id. at 241.
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the $13 billion dollar deal with a $385 million dollar break-up fee. 6 5 A
shareholder suit was filed claiming that the directors failed to obtain the
best available price under Revlon.66
The Delaware Supreme Court began its analysis by stating that
Revlon "did not create any new fiduciary duties . . . [but] simply held that
the 'board must perform its fiduciary duties in the service of a specific
objective: maximizing the sale price of the enterprise.'"67 While the trial
court had found that the plaintiffs might be able to prevail on a duty of
care claim that the directors had breached their Revlon duties,68 Lyondell's
charter contained an exculpatory provision under section 102 (b)(7), which
eliminated director liability for money damages for those potential
breaches. 69 Turning to the duty of loyalty, the court found that the
directors were independent, and not motivated by self-interest or ill will,
leaving only a claim that the directors had acted in bad faith in violation
of their Revlon duties. 70 To prevail on this claim, however, the
shareholders would need to establish that the Lyondell directors
intentionally disregarded their fiduciary duties, by "knowingly and
completely fail[ing] to undertake their responsibilities," under Revlon. 71
In other words, the lower court's "inquiry should have been whether those
directors utterly failed to attempt to obtain the best sale price." 72
In the aftermath of Lyondell, little evidence of director effort is
required to satisfy this extremely low standard. Absent a competing
bidder, it is difficult to frame a breach of loyalty complaint except in the
very unusual circumstance of self-dealing by the target directors. Since a
high percentage of Delaware corporations have exculpatory provisions for
duty of care liability, and the duty of loyalty standard for money damage
liability is very high for independent directors, it is not surprising that most
shareholder litigation shifted its focus from directors failing to conduct an
auction to the much easier to formulate allegations of disclosure violations
by boards in proxy materials sent to shareholders. As we shall see below,
this may have ultimately led to an enormous increase in disclosure-focused
litigation.

6

Id. at 238.
at 239.

6Id.
67 id.

' It is important in understanding Delaware's retreat in this area that the Lyondell Court
observed that Revlon requires only that "[d]irectors' decisions be reasonable, not perfect." Id.
at 243.
Id. at 239.
7
o Id. at 239-40.
71 Id. at 243-44.
72
Id. at 244.

"
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Lyondell illustrates how Revlon's broad command invited litigation
as there is little in Revlon that permits an ex ante determination of whether
the facts support a finding that the directors conducted an auction.
Lyondell is an example of the ad hoc inquiry that flows naturally from
Revlon's overbreadth. Some commentators suggest that one potential
mechanism to address such uncertainty is by expanding the doctrine of
shareholder ratification to curtail post-closing damage actions.
However, the Delaware Supreme Court precedent placed significant
barriers in the way of this type of initiative: first in In re Santa Fe Pacific
Corp. ShareholderLitigation7 4 and later in Gantlerv. Stephens." Of these
two opinions, Gantler more clearly explained the law when it stated:
[W]e hold that the scope of the shareholder ratification
doctrine must be limited to its so-called "classic" form: that
is, to circumstances where a fully informed shareholder vote
approves director action that does not legally require
shareholder approval in order to become legally effective.
Moreover, the only director action or conduct that can be
ratified is that which the shareholders are specifically asked
to approve.76
In other words, under Gantler and Santa Fe, a merger vote that is
statutorily required has no ratification effect whatsoever. Instead, if the
defendants want to ratify any claims made against them for breach of
fiduciary duties in agreeing to the deal, they must hold a second
shareholder vote: one in the "classic" form, and one to specifically ask
shareholders to approve only the ratification of the alleged misconduct.
The virtue of presenting shareholders with separate votes is that it avoids
"bundling" the two decisions and obscuring shareholders' true
preferences.
Recently, however, in a highly significant decision, the Delaware
Supreme Court revisited the validity of these cases in Corwin v. KKR
7 See, e.g., J. Travis Laster, The Effect of Stockholder Approval on EnhancedScrutiny,
40 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 1443 (2014).
7 669 A.2d 59, 68 (Del. 1995).
7 965 A.2d 695, 713 (Del. 2009) (en banc).
76 Id. (emphasis in original) (noting that the Santa Fe decision in 1995 had the same
effect).
n James D. Cox, et al., Quieting the Shareholders' Voice: Empirical Evidence of
Pervasive Bundling in Proxy Solicitations, 89 S. CAL. L. REv. 1175, 1178 (2016) ("[T]he
joinder of unrelated substantive items causes shareholders to approve items that they might not
otherwise want implemented and also robs the directors of awareness of the shareholders' views
on each bundled proposal.").
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FinancialHoldings LLC.78 The case involved a stock-for-stock merger
between a limited partnership (KKR & Co. L.P., or "KKR") and a limited
liability company (KKR Financial Holdings LLC., or "Financial
Holdings"), although oddly the case was briefed as though it involved two
corporations.79 The merger was subject to the approval of a majority of
the disinterested shareholders of Financial Holdings."o
The plaintiffs argued on appeal that the case should be reviewed
under the Revlon standard.8 1 The Delaware Supreme Court applied Revlon
even though the plaintiffs had not raised the Revlon issue in the Court of
Chancery. 82 Corwin held that in an arms-length M&A transaction a fully
informed non-coerced vote of approval by the disinterested stockholders
displaces Revlon and invokes the business judgment rule.83 The court
stated that its holding was not in conflict with the earlier decision in
Gander, arguing both that Gantler's requirement of a separate vote in
ratification situations was dictum, and that it would not have overruled
other Delaware ratification precedent without expressly mentioning it.'
The court offered policy arguments in response to plaintiffs' claims
that allowing ratification of Revlon and Unocal claims would "expose
stockholders to unfair action by directors without protection."" First, the
court stated that Unocal and Revlon were not "designed with post-closing
money damages claims in mind, the standards they articulate do not match
the gross negligence standard for director due care liability under Van
Gorkom, and with the prevalence of exculpatory charter provisions, due
care liability is rarely even available."" This observation has far-reaching
implications as it appears to confine Revlon duties to equitable relief,
except where there is egregious misconduct. Second, the court noted that
without full disclosure, ratification would be ineffective.87 Third, the court

78

125 A.3d 304 (Del. 2015) (en banc).

7

Id. at 306 n.3.

8o Id. at 305; In re KKR Fin. Holdings LLC S'holder Litig., 101 A3d 980, 988 (Del.
Ch. 2014), aff'd sub nom.
1 Corwin, 125 A.2d at 306-308. Plaintiffs also argued that KKR was the controlling
shareholder of Financial Holdings and therefore the transaction was subject to the entire fairness
standard of review. The Supreme Court rejected that argument, upholding the Court of
Chancery's earlier determination that KKR did not have voting power or management control
of Financial Holdings that were sufficient to constitute effective control under Delaware law.

Id. at 308.
"Id. at 308 (It is well-settled Delaware law that parties must raise all issues in the court
below or they will have waived their right to raise them on appeal).
83

Id.
"Id.
8
Id.
86 Id.
87

Id.

at 308-09.
at 311.
at 312.
(referencing Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985)).
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unqualifiedly embraced the protective effects of a fully informed,
uncoerced vote:
When the real parties in interest-the disinterested equity
owners-can easily protect themselves at the ballot box by
simply voting no, the utility of a litigation-intrusive standard
of review promises more costs to the stockholders in the form
of litigation rents and inhibitions on risk-taking than it
promises in terms of benefits to them.
We therefore see that the Delaware Supreme Court has provided a
procedural route to provide ex ante certainty that Revlon is satisfied-a
fully informed uncoerced shareholder vote.
D. Corwin's Costs andBenefits

&

Corwin's significance occurs on two important fronts. First, and
most obviously, it allows stockholder approval to supplant Revlon,
provided the transaction is not one that otherwise triggers an entire fairness
inquiry because it is with a related party. Second, and of great significance
to corporate law, Corwin holds that the shareholder vote, compelled by
statute for the transaction to be duly undertaken, can also serve as a vote
ratifying any lapse under Revlon or for that matter any other fiduciary
principle. While there is a good deal of interconnection between these two
facets of Corwin, each has distinct implications.
Corwin's impact on Revlon can be illustrated by revisiting the
court's precedent and asking how it would be affected today. For example,
in C&J Energy Services v. City of Miami General Employees'
Sanitation Employees' Retirement Trust ("C&J Energy Services"), the
Delaware Supreme Court observed that "Revlon does not require a board
to set aside its own view of what is best for the corporation's stockholders
and run an auction whenever the board approves a change of control
transaction." 89 The court held that evidence of a market check is required,
but it need "not have to involve an active solicitation, so long as interested
bidders have a fair opportunity to present a higher-value alternative, and
the board has the flexibility to eschew the original transaction and accept

RId. at 312-13.
9 C&J Energy Servs. v. City of Miami Gen. Emps.' & Sanitation Emps.' Ret. Tr., 107
A.3d 1049, 1067 (Del. 2014) (en banc).
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the higher-value deal."90 A fully independent board's judgment regarding
whether the circumstances permit a market check is-in the court's
view-entitled to great deference. It thus held the Court of Chancery erred
in holding that Revlon required that the company be able to solicit
competing bidders. 91 The court emphasized that the board, while not able
to actively solicit competing bidders, had negotiated a broad fiduciary out
provision that enabled the board over the next five months to accept a
competing bid, albeit an unsolicited one, as the company was subject only
to a relatively modest $65 million dollar termination fee. 92
With respect to the first of Corwin's effects, compare the approach
taken in C&J Energy Services, where the court's belief and focus was on
the freedom the board had to accept a competing offer.93 To the court,
because the transaction would not close for over five months, the
termination fee was relatively small, and the board had negotiated for the
right to accept a better offer (a fiduciary out clause), the board's action
appeared a reasonable means to passively test whether a better offer was
possible. 94 Presumably, if the deal closure was sooner and the termination
fee larger, the board's reasonableness would be viewed as more suspect.
Enter Corwin. A suitor, and the target board, can be expected to
prefer the more certain outcome of a shareholder vote over the ex post
uncertainty that a judge would find that the board had taken steps
reasonably designed to meet the board's Revlon duties. We can expect,
post Corwin, the antidote for a Revlon inquiry will itself be an approving
vote of the stockholders, at least when there is a single suitor. Note that
C&J Energy Services itself would appear to protect the directors' choice
of ratification over steps to pursue an active or passive market check. 95 If
this occurs, we can expect that auction-like mechanisms, such as passive
market checks, will become pass6 among dealmakers. 96
The second facet of Corwin-that the statutorily mandated vote for
the transaction can also serve to displace Revlon-is more troubling.
Recall that Corwin requires that the vote be uncoerced. 9 7 Because
' Id. at 1070 (The court further observed that the ability of the stockholders "to freely
accept or reject the board's preferred course of action is also of great importance.").
" Id. at 1067-68.
9 Id. at 1070.
93
1d. at 1053.
9 Id.
95
See id. at 1071.
* Of course, the Delaware Court of Chancery is a court of equity and when confronted
with evidence of obvious wrongdoing can fashion an equitable remedy. This principle could be
at work in cases where the shareholder vote approving the transaction was subject to "structural
coercion," such as where the vote was structured in a way that it may be seen as "driven by
matters extraneous to the merits of the transaction." Sciabacucchi v. Liberty Broadband Corp.,
C.A. No. 11418-VCG, 2017 WL 2352152, at *2 (Del. Ch. May 31, 2017).
1 Corwin v. KKR Fin. Holdings, LLC, 125 A.3d 304, 312-13 (Del. 2015) (en banc).
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termination fees are ubiquitous, there will always be claims that
shareholder approval was not without compulsion as failure to secure the
requisite vote could trigger the company's requirement to pay the
disappointed suitor. Further, the shareholder vote post Corwin assumes
such significance, being the disciplining force for pursuit of the best offer.
Therefore, courts can expect to give even greater attention to the
termination fee and other features of the deal that may bear on whether the
shareholder vote was sufficiently free of external threats.
More significantly, allowing, as Corwin does, the shareholder vote
to approve the transaction also to excuse any failure under Revlon on the
part of the board, invokes the classic problem of shareholders being
confronted with a distorted choice. Included within Corwin's specter
would be the instance of a single acquiring firm's offer joined with a
candid statement that the board had little time to pursue other suitors,
perhaps because of the aggressiveness of the first suitor. In such a case,
shareholders collectively are poorly positioned to assess whether a better
deal with the suitor or with another suitor could have been obtained.
Voting against the transaction means the firm offer, likely with a premium
to market, would disappear. There would also be great uncertainty
regarding the consequences of a negative shareholder vote. Moreover,
with that rejection, the shareholders could not expect any recovery against
the directors (and perhaps outside advisors), since damages would turn on
speculation of what offer or offers would have been forthcoming had the
board fulfilled its duties under Revlon.
But the greatest uncertainty is just what the positive vote
communicates. Bundling the certainty of a deal, but perhaps not an
optimal one, with disclosure of board laxity in pursuing the best deal
reasonably available, hardly sends a clarion image of unwavering approval
of each. In contrast, requiring a separate vote on the transaction and
ratification of the directors' handling of the transaction avoids these
problems.98

" See Cox et al., supra note 77; see also Sciabacucchi, 2017 WL 2352152, at *4 (finding
structural coercion where two substantially unrelated items were bundled in a single resolution
submitted to the shareholders).
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III. FROM WEINBERGER TO M&F WORLDWIDE: WRITING THE
CONTROLLING SHAREHOLDERS' PLAYBOOK FOR MINORITY SQUEEZEOUTS99

Controlling shareholders have many motivations for squeezing out
the minority shareholders in companies they control such as, seeking to
gain access to target assets, eliminating the costs of public ownership,
capturing gains from synergies in operating the target company, or
eliminating future concerns for self-dealing by placing all operations
under a single entity, to name a just a few.100 In eliminating public
shareholders from the company, some of the controllers' actions may
benefit all shareholders of the company on a pro rata basis, while others
lead to gains that are disproportionately appropriated by the controller. In
the former situation, the law defers to the self-interest of the controlling
shareholder because its actions bestow proportionate gains to all of the
investors. However, where the controller engages in self-dealing conduct,
resulting in it getting more than its fair share of the benefits from its
actions, then the controlling shareholders' fiduciary duties are triggered
and the court will review the fairness of the underlying transaction. 101 This
standard has been widely adopted by courts but Weinberger stands out for
applying it to minority shareholder squeeze-outs in Delaware
corporations.
A. Weinberger Endorses the FairnessStandardofReview for Squeeze-Out
Mergers
Weinberger v. UOP, Inc. involved a controlling shareholder
squeeze-out of a large block of minority shareholders in UOP, Inc.102 The
Signal Companies Inc. ("Signal") held 50.5% of UOP's stock that it had
acquired several years earlier in an arm's length transaction, in part
" The concerns raised in this section may extend more broadly to any self-dealing
merger as the entire fairness test would likely be applied by the Delaware courts even in a stockfor-stock transaction in these circumstances.
"aSee generally RONALD J. GILSON AND BERNARD S. BLACK, THE LAW AND FINANCE
OF CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS, 1238-47 (2d ed. 1995). These types of transaction have been

thought to have great potential for abuse. Victor Brudney & Marvin Chirelstein, A Restatement
of Corporate Freezeouts, 87 YALE L.J. 1354 (1978) (closely analyzing a range of potential
abuses to shareholders and suggesting procedural mechanisms as a meaningful prophylaxis). At
the time Weinberger was decided, fears of such abuses were sufficient to prompt an ABAsponsored committee to provide guidance for such transactions. ABA Committee on Corporate
Law, Guidelines on Going Private, 37 Bus. LAW. 313, 315-16 (1981).
1o' Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971) ("When the situation
involves a parent and a subsidiary, with the parent controlling the transaction and fixing the
terms, the test of intrinsic fairness, with its resulting shifting of the burden ofproot is applied.").
12 457 A.2d 701, 702-703 (Del. 1981) (en banc).

342

DELAWARE JOURNAL OF CORPORATE LAW

VOL. 42

through a public tender offer at a substantial premium over the market
price. 03 Following that transaction, Signal appointed several of its
employees to the UOP board and two of them, Arledge and Chitiea, later
prepared a memo that included a valuation of UOP, which they put
together using UOP information. 104 They shared the memo with the Signal
board but did not share it with the non-Signal members of the UOP
Ultimately, the transaction was hastily approved by both
board. 10
companies' board of directors, but there was no evidence that UOP's board
attempted to negotiate the deal price, and the speed of the transaction led
the UOP investment bankers to hurriedly prepare their fairness opinion. 106
Nevertheless, a majority of the minority shareholders voted to approve the
transaction, albeit without full disclosure of the above facts.o7
The Delaware Supreme Court held that the governing standard of
judicial review was the "entire fairness" standard that applies to selfdealing. 108 It found that Signal did not meet this standard because it failed
to show fair price and fair dealing in connection with the cash-out
merger. 109 The case was remanded to the Court of Chancery to determine
what price entire fairness demanded. The result, however:
[C]ould have been entirely different if UOP had appointed an
independent negotiating committee of its outside directors to
deal with Signal at arm's length .... Particularly in a parentsubsidiary context, a showing that the action taken was as
though each of the contending parties had in fact exerted its
bargaining power against the other at arm's length is strong
evidence that the transaction meets the test of fairness.1 10
The court's holding regarding the effects of a majority of the
minority shareholder vote on the burden of proof in a controlling
shareholder squeeze-out was less noticed. Drawing on Michelson v.
Duncan, the Weinberger court held that such a vote would have shifted the
burden of proof onto the plaintiffs to show the transaction was unfair."
Id. at 704.
" Id. at 705.
103

5

1o

Id. at 707.

'" Id. at 708.
]07 Id.
0
' ' Id. at 710.

'"Id. at 711-12.
"o Id. at 709 n.7.
"' Id. at 703 (citing Michelson v. Duncan, 407 A.2d 211, 224 (Del. 1979)).
Interestingly, Michelson did not involve a controlling shareholder squeeze-out, but rather a
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However, the court found the vote to be uninformed and therefore
ineffective." 2
Although there are other important aspects of the decision,1 13
Weinberger'sapplication of the entire fairness standard of judicial review
in squeeze-outs, its suggestion that controlled companies employ
independent special committees, and its holding that a majority of the
minority shareholder vote approving the transaction would result in a
burden shift, became the template for considering post- Weinberger
squeeze-out transactions.
B. Kahn v. Lynch: Burden Shiftingfrom the Use of a Special Committee
Just a little over a decade later, in Kahn v. Lynch Communications
Systems, Inc. ("Lynch I"), the Delaware Supreme Court further clarified
the effect of using a special committee of independent directors on the
appropriate standard of review to be used in a controlling shareholder
squeeze-out. 114 Alcatel held a sizeable block of shares in Lynch
Communications, which along with the power that they exercised over
Lynch's board, made them in the eyes of the court a controlling
Lynch's board deployed a special committee of
shareholder."'
independent directors that rejected Alcatel's suggestion that Lynch acquire
one of its subsidiaries, leading Alcatel to propose a squeeze-out of the
remaining publicly held shares.1 6 Lynch decided to use the same special
committee to assess the Alcatel offer." 7 After some negotiations over the
price to be paid in the transaction, Alcatel made its final offer accompanied
by the threat that if the special committee did not accept this offer, it would
move forward with a hostile tender offer at a lower price." 8
The Court was confronted with the question of how much
significance it should attach to the use of the Special Committee in
negotiating the terms of the transaction.1 19 After reviewing Weinberger's
waste claim that was brought challenging the issuance of executive stock options. Michelson,
407 A.2d at 216.
112 Weinberger, 457 A2d at 710, 712 (noting that majority stockholders have a duty of
complete candor in this context and are required to disclose all information germane to the
transaction to the minority stockholders (citing Lynch v. Vickers, 383 A.2d 278, 279, 281 (Del.
1977)).
"'For example, the court eliminated the business purpose requirement that it had earlier
adopted as a condition for approving mergers and adopted a more liberal valuation standard for
appraisal actions after declining to follow the Delaware block method. Id. at 713-15.
114 638 A.2d 1110 (Del. 1994).
" Id. at 1112.
11 id.

"IId. at 1113.

11

8 id.
19

' Id. at 1116.
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holding that courts should apply the entire fairness test to control
shareholder squeeze-outs, the court noted the burden shifting effects of an
informed vote by the majority of minority investors,120 and observed that
the use of a properly empowered special committee should have a similar
effect in the entire fairness analysis.121 However, the court qualified this
observation, holding that before any burden shift can occur, the court must
carefully scrutinize the "special committee's real bargaining power." 12 2
The court decided that there was sufficient evidence pled to support a
claim that the Special Committee did not exercise real bargaining power
and, therefore, its recommendation did not shift the burden of proving
entire fairness from Alcatel. 123
Although the court was not presented with the question of what
impact it would ascribe to the use of both a special committee and a
majority of the minority vote on the standard of review for the transaction,
its discussion of the rationale for retaining fairness review is telling. At
one point, the court stated "[e]ntire fairness remains the proper focus for
judicial analysis in examining an interested merger, irrespective of
whether the burden of proof remains upon or is shifted away from the
controlling or dominating shareholder, because the unchanging nature of
the underlying 'interested' transaction requires careful scrutiny."1 24 The
Court further discussed the policy rationale for applying the entire fairness
standard, pointing out that "[e]ven where no coercion is intended,
shareholders voting on a parent subsidiary merger might perceive that their
disapproval could risk retaliation of some kind by the controlling
stockholder[,]" such as stopping dividend payments, or pursuing a later
cash out merger at a lower price.1 25 This form of inherent coercion is not
eliminated just because either a special committee and/or a majority of the
minority vote is employed. Kahn therefore applied the entire fairness
standard to the merger.
120

Id. at 1116-17 ("[A]pproval of a merger . . by an informed vote of a majority of the
minority stockholders, while not a legal prerequisite, shifts the burden of proving the unfairness
of the merger entirely to the plaintiffs." (quoting Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil, 493 A.2d 929, 937
(Del. 1985))).
' Id. at 1117.
1 22 Id. at 1117-18.
123 Id. at 1120-21. Lynch I's clarity was muddied by the Delaware Supreme Court's
subsequent decision in the same litigation, where it affirmed the Court of Chancery's grant of
judgment in favor of the underlying defendant company. Kahn v. Lynch Commc'n Sys. Inc.,
669 A.2d 79 (Del. 1995) ("Lynch Ir'), aff'g Kahn v. Lynch Commc'n Sys., Civ.A. No. 8748,
1995 WL 301403 (Del. Ch. Apr. 17, 1995) ("Lynch II") (hereinafter collectively with preceding
litigation "Lynch").
124 Lynch I, 638 A.2d at 1116.
'" Id. at 1117 (quoting Citron v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 584 A.2d 490, 502
(Del. Ch. 1990)).
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So long as the court employs the entire fairness test in analyzing
control shareholder squeeze-outs, Weinberger has teeth.
A good
illustration is the decision by then Chancellor Strine in In re Southern Peru
Copper Corp.126 In that case, Grupo Mexico, the controlling shareholder
of Southern Peru Copper, asked Southern Peru to purchase Minera
Copper, a privately held corporation in which Grupo Mexico owned
99.15% of the stock.1 27 Southern Peru formed a special committee, but it
was empowered only to consider the offer that was put on the table; i.e., it
did not have the power to seek alternative terms or other suitors. 128 The
court found that the special committee did not engage in effective
bargaining, and that the deal was not conditioned on the approval of a
majority of the minority Southern Peru shareholders (even though a
majority of them did actually vote to approve the deal).1 29 The court
therefore held that it would not shift the burden of proof in the fairness
analysis onto the plaintiffs.130 In fact, the court found that the defendants
did not carry their burden of demonstrating the deal was fair to the
minority shareholders and awarded the shareholders $1.347 billion in
damages.1"'
However, giving Weinberger teeth also gives frivolous shareholder
plaintiffs' claims traction in the litigation settlement process. In the wake
of Weinberger and Lynch, where the bare existence of a control
relationship triggered an entire fairness inquiry, defendants have great
difficulty getting one of these cases dismissed in pre-trial motion
practice.132 As we develop more fully below, defendants have claimed
that this leads to many meritless suits challenging control shareholder
squeeze-outs because of the prospect that even bad cases will result in a
favorable settlement.
C. Kahn v. M&F Worldwide: Business Judgment Review Returns
Lynch did not resolve an important question: if a controlling
shareholder conditions completion of a squeeze-out merger on a
combination of a majority of the minority shareholder vote, and the
126 52 A.3d 761 (Del. Ch. 2011), aff'd sub nom. Ams. Mining Corp. v. Theriault, 51
A.3d 1213 (Del. 2015).
127

128

129

Id. at 765-66.
1d

Id. at 791-92.
Id. at 793.
1

30

1
13

d. at 819.

132 See In re Cox Commc'ns, Inc., 879 A.2d 604, 605 (Del. Ch. 2005) (stating that

"[blecause [the] standard [set forth in Lynch] makes it impossible for a controlling stockholder
ever to structure a transaction in a manner that will enable it to obtain dismissal of a complaint
challenging the transaction, each Lynch case has settlement value, not necessarily because of its
merits but because it cannot be dismissed.").
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approval of the transaction by an empowered special committee, will this
prompt the court to apply the highly deferential business judgment
standard of review? Even though Lynch expressed concern about the
implicit coercive effect of a controlling shareholder on a special committee
or a majority of the minority vote, would the Delaware courts set that
concern aside for self-dealing squeeze-outs accomplished by a menu of
governance steps that in combination present an appearance, if not the
reality, of independence? This idea was floated in 2005, when then-Vice
Chancellor Strine suggested that:
Delaware law would improve the protections it offers to minority
shareholders and the integrity of the representative litigation process by
reforming and extending Lynch . .. [t]he reform would be to invoke the
business judgment standard of review when a going private merger with a
controlling stockholder was effected using a process that mirrored both
elements of an arm's length merger: 1) approval by disinterested directors;
and 2) approval by disinterested shareholders."'
To simulate these two things in a controlled corporation, then-Vice
Chancellor Strine proposed requiring the approval of an empowered
special committee and approval by a majority of the disinterested
shareholders.134 Ten years later, this approach was ultimately embraced
by the Delaware Supreme Court in Kahn v. M&F Worldwide Corp.
("MFi"). 3 5 MacAndrews and Forbes Holdings Inc. was a controlling
"'Id. at 606.
134Then-Vice Chancellor Strine opined:
[W]hen a merger with a controlling stockholder was: 1) negotiated and
approved by a special committee of independent directors; and 2)
conditioned on an affirmative vote of a majority of the minority
stockholders, the business judgment standard of review should
presumptively apply, and any plaintiff ought to have to plead particularized
facts that, if true, support an inference that, despite the facially fair process,
the merger was tainted because of fiduciary wrongdoing. This reform to
Lynch would not permit a controller to obtain business judgment rule
protection merely by using a special committee or a majority of the
minority vote; in that case, Lynch in its current form would still govern. To
invoke the business judgment rule standard of review, the controller would
have to replicate fully both elements of the arms-length merger process.
Id.
.3. Kahn v. M&F Worldwide Corp. (M&FII), 88 A.3d 635 (Del. 2014) (en banc), aff'g
In re MFW S'holders Litig. (M&F I), 67 A.3d 496 (Del. Ch. 2013) (Strine, C.) (hereinafter
collectively "M&F Worldwide"). Shortly before the M&FI opinion was handed down, Strine
left the Court of Chancery and was appointed as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. Tom Hals,
Leo Strine confirmed as chiefjustice of Delaware'sSupreme Court, REUTERS (Jan. 29, 2014,
7:05 PM), https://tinyurl.com/y9roapzz. Strine did not participate in the review ofhis underlying
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shareholder of M&F Worldwide Co. ("MFW").136 It made a proposal to
take the company private contingent upon two procedural protections: the
resulting merger would have to be negotiated and approved by an
independent special committee of MFW directors and the merger would
need to be approved by a majority of the minority shareholders of MFW. 1 7

MFW formed a special committee and empowered it to negotiate on behalf
of the company. 13 8 The committee members were found by the court to
be independent. 13 9 The court also found that the special committee had
engaged in a lengthy investigation of the offer and the company's options,
and negotiated an increase in the initial offering price.140 The special
committee's independent investment banker deemed the offer to be fair
and the special committee approved the deal. 14 1 Subsequently, a fully
informed vote of the majority of the minority investors also approved the
merger. 142
The parties disagreed over the impact of this process. The
defendants' position was that they had succeeded in simulating the same
structure that exists in an arm's length merger: the special committee was
like a disinterested board of directors in an arm's length merger and the
majority of the minority vote was like the shareholder vote in an arm's
length merger.143 Since both board and shareholder approval were
functionally equivalent to those in an arm's length deal, the defendants
believed that the business judgment standard of review should apply.'"
Plaintiffs claimed that this was not the case-they argued that a special
committee of independent directors in a controller acquisition is
comprised of directors that have been appointed by the controller and are
therefore unlike directors at a non-controlled company. 145 Furthermore,
as the Delaware Supreme Court had said in the past, a majority of the
minority vote suffers from inherent coercion, 146 which is to say that the
minority shareholders know that they may experience future retribution if

opinion in M&FI. KarleeWeinmann,Del. High Court Affirms MFWRulingJn Win For Boards,
LAW360 (Mar. 14, 2014, 12:10 PM).
136 M&FII, 88 A.3d at 640.
37
Id. at 638.
13
1 d. at 641.
139 Id. at 650.
' 40 Id. at 653.
141 id
142 Id.

143 Id. at 639-40.
'" Id. at 639-40.
1 45 Id. at 639.
'" Kahn v. Lynch Commc'n Sys. Inc. (Lynch I), 638 A.2d 1110, 1115-16 (Del. 1994)
(finding that because of the threat of inherent coercion, a protective device, such as a majority
of the minority vote, cannot alter the standard of'judicial review).
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they succeed in stopping a bad squeeze-out merger, even if there is no
explicit threat by the controller to do SO.147
Weighing these arguments, the Delaware Supreme Court ruled for
the defendants and applied the business judgment standard of review,
stating:
[I]n controller buyouts, the business judgment standard of
review will be applied if and only if (i) the controller
conditions the procession of the transaction on the approval
of both a Special Committee and a majority of the minority
stockholders; (ii) the Special Committee is independent; (iii)
the Special Committee is empowered to freely select its own
advisors and to say no definitively; (iv) the Special
Committee meets its duty of care in negotiating a fair price;
(v) the vote of the minority is informed; and (vi) there is no
coercion of the minority. 14 8
D. The Pluses and Minuses of M&F Worldwide
While it is still early to forecast the long-term impact of the M&F
Worldwide litigation, undoubtedly it will bring about a significant
decrease in the number of shareholder suits challenging the terms of
controlling shareholder squeeze-outs. Calculating controllers will be
careful to follow the steps outlined in the court's opinion and receive the
desired dismissal of any investor challenges. Predictably, the Court of
Chancery has shown the way for such dismissals to occur at an early stage
in the proceedings, cutting off discovery for plaintiffs that cannot show
obvious defects in the transaction based on public disclosures. 14 9
147 See id.
M&FII, 88 A.3d at 645 (emphasis in original).
149 See IRA Trust FBO Bobbie Ahmed v. Crane, C.A. No. 12742-CB, 2017 WL
7053964, at *9 (Del. Ch. Dec. 11, 2017) ("Although [M&F 1] itself was decided after discovery
on a motion for summary judgment, its framework has been applied at the pleadings stage as
well."); see also In re Books-A-Million, Inc. S'holders Litig., C.A. No. 11343-VCL, 2016 WL
5874974, at *60 (Del. Ch. Oct. 10, 2016) (citing M&FIwith approval and invoking the business
judgment rule to dismiss the plaintiffs claim that a merger constituted waste). "[It is] logically
difficult to conceptualize how a plaintiff can ultimately prove a waste or gift claim in the face
of a decision by fully informed, uncoerced, independent stockholders to ratify the transaction."
Books-A-Million, 2016 WL 5874974, at *60 (quoting Harbor Fin. Partners v. Huizenga, 751
A.2d 879, 901 (Del. Ch. 1999), reprintedin 25 DEL. J. CORP. L. 931). "For purposes of applying
the M&F Worldwide framework on a motion to dismiss, the standard of review for measuring
compliance with the duty of care is whether the complaint has alleged facts supporting a
reasonably conceivable inference that the directors were grossly negligent." Id. (quoted in
Crane, 2017 WL 7053964, at *12 n.102 (dismissing plaintiff's claim that a committed formed
14 8
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However, some other, less desirable, effects seem likely too. First,
plaintiffs who believe they suffered an injury from the transaction will
seek an alternative forum to present their cases.150 The current upsurge in
appraisal litigation is likely, at least in part, due to this effect."' Deal
litigation is likely to migrate from Delaware state courts to alleging
disclosure violations in federal courts.152 Second, controllers, safe from
the prying eyes of plaintiffs' lawyers, are likely to be less careful about
protecting the interests of minority shareholders in squeeze-outs. If they
carefully follow the process requirements laid out in the M&F litigation,
why should they agree to pay high premiums as well? After all, once the
steps of M&F are at least facially complied with, why would a rational
plaintiffs' attorney file suit in a low premium deal? Once deal premiums
adjust to lower levels, investors will be less excited about buying minority
interests in controlled companies and stock prices in these companies will
decline.
IV. UNOCAL AND ITS DECLINE

The number of hostile M&A transactions doubled from 1968 to
1975.153 As hostile deals became more important, so did the perception
that the market for corporate control had run amok. Commentators
identified a variety of alleged evils arising out of hostile takeovers. 154
Some argued that the takeover market was myopic and therefore
to review and approve conflicted transactions "breach[ed] of its duty of care in negotiating a fair
price" by failing to demand a fairness opinion)).
150 See Randall S. Thomas & Robert B. Thompson, A Theory of Representative
ShareholderSuits andIts Application to MultiurisdictionalLitigation, 106 Nw. U.L. REv. 1753,
1779 (2012).
"' See Wei Jiang et al., Reforming the DelawareAppraisalStatute to Address Appraisal
Arbitrage: Will It Be Successful, 59 J.L. & ECON. 697 (2016) (showing a rise in appraisal actions
over the 2002-2014 period).
152 Cain, et al., supra note 9, at 608.
"5 GILsoN AND BLACK, supra note 100, at 26.
154 See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Regulating the Market for Corporate Control: A
CriticalAssessment of the Tender Offer, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 1145, 1199-216 (1984); Edward S.
Herman & Louis Lowenstein, The Efficiency Effects ofHostile Takeovers, in KNIGHTS, RAIDERS
AND TARGETS: THE IMPACT OF THE HOSTILE TAKEOVER 211

(John C. Coffee, Louis

Lowenstein & Susan Rose-Ackerman eds., 1988); Louis Lowenstein, Pruning Deadwood in
Hostile Takeovers: A Proposalfor Legislation, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 249 (1983); WALTER
ADAMS AND JAMES W. BROCK, MERGER-MANIA: AN EMPIRICAL CRITIQUE IN HOSTILE

TAKEOVERS: ISSUES IN PUBLIC AND CORPORATE POLICY 37-38 (David L. McKee, ed., 1989);

Harvey L. Pitt, On the Precipice:A ReexaminationofDirectors'FiduciaryDuties in the Context
of Hostile Acquisitions, 15 DEL. J. CORP. L. 811 (1990); William Proxmire, Symposium, The
Risks and Rewards ofRegulating Corporate Takeovers: What's Right and Wrong about Hostile
Takeovers? 1988 WIS. L. REV. 353 (1988); Morgan Shipman, Symposium, Regulating

CorporateTakeovers: The Casefor ReasonableState Regulation ofCorporateTakeovers: Some
ObservationsConcerning the Ohio Experience, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 507, 533-37 (1988).
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companies were being sold for too little." Others claimed that takeovers
inflicted great costs on companies' stakeholders, such as employees and
customers.156 Another theory was that takeovers forced directors and
managers to focus on short-term results instead of maximizing long-term
value creation."' A fourth hypothesis was that takeovers contributed to
inefficiency as leveraged buyouts forced acquirers to reduce expenses and
investment to increase cash flow in the short-term, and corporations that
are highly leveraged have less ability to weather economic downturns.158
Finally, the disciplinary effects of takeovers were claimed to be overstated,
especially when compared to the diseconomies produced by takeovers. 15 9
Delaware judges perceived that takeovers posed a corporate
governance issue. 16 0 In a retrospective article chronicling the history of
the 1985 Unocal decision, former Delaware Supreme Court Justice,
Andrew G.T. Moore II, wrote that the court (which he was sitting on at the
time) relied heavily on the argument that boards of directors should be
permitted to resist inadequate hostile bids. 161 The court, he observed, was
concerned with corporate "raiders who employed coercive tactics to
acquire control with cheap, undervalued bids." 162 As a result, they decided

'. MICHAEL T. JACOBS, SHORT-TERM AMERICA: THE CAUSES AND CURES OF OUR

BUSINESS MYOPIA 114 (1991); Martin Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target's Boardroom, 35
BUS. LAW. 101, 109-10 (1979); Herman & Lowenstein, supra note 154 at 214-16.
56 Proxmire, supra note 154, at 359-60; Lipton, supra note 155 at 109-10; Pitt, supra
note 154 at 840.
'" Jacobs, supra note 155 at 126; Pitt, supra note 154 at 840 n.] 10; Harold M. Williams,
It's Time for a Takeover Moratorium: The Tactics Used by Raiders and Managers of Target
Companies are Undermining Shareholder Rights, FORTUNE,
July 22,
1985,
http://archive.fortune.comhmagazines/fortune/fortunearchive/1985/07/22/66154/index.htm.
1ss See Jacobs, supra note 155, at 130, 137-38.
These diseconomies included the wealth
156 See Coffee, supra note 154, at 1153.
transfer effects of takeovers, the riskier behavior managers engaged in to avoid becoming
takeover targets, excessive deterrence leading to demoralization, and the adverse effect on
managerial labor markets. Id. at 1156-1159.
"6o Steven Davidoff Solomon and Randall S. Thomas, The Rise and Fall ofDelaware 's
Takeover Standards (European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) - Law Research Paper
No. 329/2016; Vanderbilt Law and Economics Research Paper No. 16-24),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfn?abstractid=2830257.
6' Andrew G.T. Moore II, The Birth of Unocal-A Brief History, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L.
865, 870, 881 (2006) (citing Lipton, supra note 155; Martin Lipton & Andrew R. Brownstein,
Takeover Responses and Directors'Responsibilities: An Update, ABA NATIONAL INSTITUTE
ON THE DYNAMICS OF CORPORATE CONTROL (Dec. 8, 1983), reprinted in 40 Bus. Law. 1403
(1985)). In Unocal Corp v. Mesa Petroleum Co., the Delaware Supreme Court stated that
directors could consider the interests of creditors, customers, employees and perhaps the general
community in determining how a takeover bid will affect the corporation. Id. at 884 (citing
Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985)).
162 Moore II, supra note 162, at 881.
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against the arguments made by many law and economics scholars that the
board of directors should remain passive in response to a hostile bid. 163
A. Unocal: The Promise of EnhancedJudicialReview for Takeover
Defenses
Unocal caused the above concerns to come to a head and presented
a vehicle for the Delaware Supreme Court to address them. The case
involved a hostile takeover attempt by T. Bone Pickens, a well-known
takeover specialist, who had previously engaged in greenmail at several
companies. 16 4 In April of 1985, he launched a "two-tier, 'front loaded'
cash tender offer" for a controlling stake in Unocal Corporation, where the
consideration in the front end of the tender offer was significantly more
valuable than what was to be paid to non-tendering shareholders in the
planned second step merger. 16 5 The effect of this two-tiered structure was
to coerce shareholders into tendering into the front end tender offer,
thereby helping to ensure that Pickens was successful in gaining control
of Unocal.'1
The Unocal board, with the assistance of its investment
banks, closely examined the offer, ultimately concluding that the price
offered by Pickens was "inadequate," because it was below the value that
the board believed it would receive in a sale of the company. 167
Unocal sought to offset this coercion, and to ensure that its
shareholders received an adequate price for their shares if the company
was to be sold, by implementing a discriminatory self-tender offer (which
excluded Pickens) for all of its shares that would be outstanding if Pickens
completed the front end of his offer.1 68 Although initially this self-tender
was conditioned on Pickens's completion of the front end of his offer,
subsequently Unocal's board made its self-tender offer unconditional. 169
The net effect of the self-tender was to force the company to take on large
quantities of debt and to sell assets in order to finance the repurchase of its
stock from all of its shareholders except Pickens.
The Delaware Supreme Court reasoned that "[b]ecause of the
omnipresent specter that a board may be acting primarily in its own
interests, rather than those of the corporation and its shareholders, there is
163

Id.

Unocal, 493 A.2d at 956. "The term 'greenmail' refers to the practice of buying out
a takeover bidder's stock at a premium that is not available to other shareholders in order to
prevent the takeover." Id. at n. 13.
6
1 1Id. at 949.
'6Id.
at 953.
16 7
Id. at 950.
6
1Id. at 951.
16
'64

9

id.
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an enhanced duty which calls for judicial examination at the threshold
before the protections of the business judgment rule may be conferred."o
In particular, the court detailed a two part test that it would apply in an
enhanced review of target defensive measures. The first part of the test
required the board to show that they had acted independently and in good
faith in having reasonable grounds for believing that "a danger to corporate
policy and effectiveness existed because of another person's stock
ownership."171 The second part of the test required that the defense
implemented must be "reasonable in relation to the threat posed."' 72
The Delaware Supreme Court applied this new test to uphold the
validity of Unocal's discriminatory self-tender offer."' The court found
that Pickens's offer was both inadequate and coercive, and that the Unocal
self-tender offer addressed both of those threats.1 74 Furthermore, the
Unocal board was justified in excluding Pickens from the self-tender
because it did not need to subsidize his attempted takeover of the company
and because Pickens was the cause of the threat to the company in the first
place. 171
The upshot of Unocal is that the court appeared willing to uphold
strong defensive tactics in the face of a significant threat posed by a hostile
tender offer to the corporation and its shareholders, such as a coercive and
inadequate tender offer by a bidder with an unsavory reputation. However,
the court left much unsaid: how broadly would it define what constituted
a threat under the first part of the test? Furthermore, the Unocal left the
question of how much judicial scrutiny would be involved in the
reasonableness analysis that formed the second part of the judicial inquiry
unaddressed. Given the substantial number of takeovers involving
Delaware corporations and the ensuing litigation in the Court of Chancery,
it was only a question of time before the Delaware courts would need to
more fully articulate their vision of Unocal's test.
B. Interco-MakingRoom for ShareholderChoice in Defensive Battles
The Court of Chancery's initial effort to clarify the reach of Unocal
occurred in the context of a poison pill.1 76 In May of 1988, the Rales
brothers began acquiring stock in Interco, a conglomerate with twenty-one
n0 Id. at 954.
n' Id. at 955 (citing Cheffv. Mathes, 199 A.2d 548, 554-55 (Del. 1964).
172
Id. at 955.
173
Id. at 958.
174 id

17

1 d. at 959.
176 See generally City Capital Assocs. v. Interco, Inc., 551 A.2d 787 (Del. Ch. 1988).
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different businesses in four major business areas. 77 Upon learning of the
unusual trading activity in the company's stock, Interco adopted a new
poison pill and launched a major restructuring of the company."1 8 Shortly
thereafter, the Rales filed a Schedule 13D disclosing that they owned a
substantial block of Interco stock and offered to purchase all remaining
shares at a premium price, over the market price, in a friendly transaction.
Interco's board of directors determined that the Rales' offer was
inadequate and elected instead to explore management's restructuring plan
as an alternative.' 7 9 Despite the Rales increasing their offer twice, the
Interco board steadfastly refused to remove its poison pill and continued
to proceed with steps to implement the proposed restructuring plan." 0 The
Rales sought an order requiring the Interco board to redeem its poison pill
so as to give its shareholders a choice between their tender offer and the
proposed restructuring, as well as to issue an order restraining Interco from
moving forward with the sale of one of its main divisions, Ethan Allen
furniture.8 1
Chancellor Allen examined the two types of threats identified by
courts in prior case law: (1) threats to voluntariness (i.e., coercive)1 8 2 and
(2) threats from inadequate but noncoercive offers.1 8 3 While the Rales'

.n Id. at 791.
78
' The court articulated:
To combat this perceived danger, the Company adopted a common stock
rights plan, or poison pill, in late 1985, which included a "flip-in" provision
. . . In broad outline, the "flip-in" provision contained in the rights plan
adopted on July 11 provides that, if a person reaches a threshold
shareholding of 30% of Interco's outstanding common stock, rights will be
exercisable entitling each holder of a right to purchase from the Company
that number of shares per right as, at the triggering time, have a market
value of twice the exercise price of each right.
Id. at 791-92.
" Id. at 792.
' Id. at 793-94.
' Id. at 794.
182 Id. at 797 (citing Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334 (Del.
1987); Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa
Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985)).
183 Id. at 797 ("We have held that a board is not required simply by reason of the
existence of a noncoercive offer to redeem outstanding poison pill rights.") (citing Doskocil Cos.
Inc. v. Griggy, CIV. A. No. 10,095, 1988 WL 105751 (Del. Ch. Oct. 7, 1988), reprintedin 14
DEL. J. CoRP. L. 682; Nomad Acquisition Corp. v. Damon Corp., CIV. A. Nos. 10173, 10189,
1988 WL 96192 (Del. Ch. Sept. 16, 1988) (revised and superseded by Nomad Acquisition Corp.
v. Damon Corp., CIV. A. Nos. 10173, 10189, 1988 WL 383667 (Del. Ch. Sept. 20, 1988),
reprinted in 14 DEL. J. CORP. L. 814); Facet Enters., Inc. v. Prospect Grp., Inc., 1988 WL 36140
(Del. Ch. Apr. 15, 1988), reprintedin 14 DEL. J. CORP. L. 310).
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offer was not coercive, the board asserted that it was inadequate.' 8 The
Chancellor reasoned that the board of a target company is not generally
required to redeem a poison pill when faced with a noncoercive offer,
because in such a situation the board may be able to negotiate a higher
price, or an alternative transaction that provides greater value for
shareholders.18' Nonetheless, the Chancellor found, "there may come a
time when a board's fiduciary duty will require it to redeem the rights and
permit the shareholders to choose." 186 Even though a board's conclusion
that an offer is inadequate will justify leaving a pill in place for a time in
order to negotiate with the bidder or to arrange an alternative transaction,
Chancellor Allen reasoned that that period of grace is not without limit. 187
Once such time is up, "the legitimate role of the poison pill in the context
of a noncoercive offer will have been fully satisfied[,]" so that thereafter
the pill will operate solely to preclude the shareholders from choosing a
different transaction than the one favored by the board.' 88 Given the
closeness of the values ascribed to the Rales' tender offer and value
believed to follow the management restructuring, any threat posed by the
shareholders' mistakenly selecting the wrong option was a mild threat.18 9
In the end, the Chancellor determined that in this final period, when
the poison pill had served its function of forcing a hostile bidder to raise
its price substantially, and where management was seeking to implement
an alternative transaction to the tender offer, protecting that transaction
further was not reasonable.1 90 He thus concluded that the pill should be
withdrawn so the shareholders could freely choose between the two
offers. 19 1 The Chancellor ordered the company to redeem the poison pill,
although he allowed the company to move forward with the sale of Ethan
Allen, a crucial part of the restructuring plan. 19 2 Thus, per Interco,
management could rely on the certainty provided their control offered by
the pill, but not indefinitely; at some point the craft they were taxying must
leave the protective ground, provided by the pill, and confront the
uncertain turbulence of the headwinds created by the bidder.
Subsequently, Interco appealed this decision, but because the Rales

'4Id.
at 798.
185

Id.

186Id.

1 Id.
188

19

Id.

Id. at 798-99.

1 Id. at 799.
91

Id.

to Id. at 800.
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decided to drop their tender offer, the appeal became moot.' 9 3 We thus see
that Unocal's second step is not just context specific, but it permits the
court to engage in close analysis of a poison pill's on-going efficacy in
obtaining a fair offer for the company's shares.
C. Time, Inc.-The DelawareSupreme Court Overrules Interco and Moves
Toward Business Judgment Review
Not long after Interco, in ParamountCommunications, Inc. v. Time,
Inc. ("Time, Inc."),' 94 the Delaware Supreme Court faced a choice about
the future of judicial review of hostile tender offer defensive tactics:
should it embrace the logic of Interco or move in a different direction?
Once the board had a fair opportunity to develop alternative transactions,
and to fully negotiate with a hostile bidder, Interco had potentially opened
the door to shareholder choice about the decision to accept an unwanted
tender offer. Should the justices endorse that doctrinal development, or
instead permit the target company board of directors to decide the future
of the company irrespective of the wishes of their current shareholders?
The underlying transaction was a friendly stock-for-stock merger
between Time and Warner Communications that contemplated them
coming together as part of Time's long-term business strategy of
becoming a fully integrated international media company.' 95 Shortly
before the shareholder vote on the merger, Paramount Communications
made a cash tender offer for all of the Time shares at a significant premium
above the price of Time shares that reflected the terms of the Time-Warner
transaction.1 96 Time responded by dropping the merger agreement and
making a tender offer to acquire Warner.1'9 Paramount and some Time
shareholders sued, claiming, among other things, that Time's use of the
poison pill and other defenses precluded Time shareholders from
tendering into Paramount's offer and violated Unocal.19 8
Relying on lower court decisions including Interco, the plaintiffs
argued that an all cash, all shares tender offer at a premium price had been
found to raise only two potential threats, neither of which arose in Time,
Inc.: (1) the threat of coercion that comes out of a two tiered offer and
raises the spectrum of unequal treatment of shareholders, and (2) the threat
'"Interco Inc. v. City Capital Assocs. Ltd., 556 A.2d 1070 (Del. 1988) (unpublished
table decision).
194 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990).
" Id. at 1145-46.
16 Id. at 1147.
1 The tender offer was to be followed by a second step merger using stock as
consideration. Id. at 1148.
18 Id. at 1149.
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of inadequate value from an offer at a price below what the target company
board believes in good faith to be the present value of its shares.199 The
Delaware Supreme Court flatly rejected that argument, holding that the
threats protectable by Unocal were not limited to price inadequacy or
coercion. 20 0 The court reasoned that the threat in the Time-Warner context
included the risk that some Time shareholders might mistakenly tender
into the Paramount offer in ignorance of the benefits of the strategic
combination with Warner; that there were conditions on the Paramount
offer that made its completion uncertain; and that the timing of
Paramount's offer was designed to confuse the Time shareholder vote.201
The court also manifested great deference to the board's decision about
the nature of the threats posed by an unwanted tender offer, eschewing
meaningful judicial review of the directors' claim that a threat exists.202 In
essence, the court expanded the scope of threats to control to encompass
all manner of items historically within the presumptive protection of the
business judgment rule; as such the first part of Unocal's bulwark against
managerial self-interest places only a light burden of explanation for the
board resisting an unwanted suitor.
Moreover, the Delaware Supreme Court adopted the lower court's
finding that Time's switch from a merger, requiring a shareholder vote to
a tender offer, was a reasonable response to these threats because it was
not "cramming down" a management sponsored alternative transaction but
rather just carrying forward a pre-existing transaction in an altered form.203
Finally, the proposed combination, if effected, did not preclude the future
possibility that Paramount could make an offer for the combined
Time/Warner entity. 204 As a result, the court concluded that the Unocal
standard had been satisfied. 205
Time, Inc. greatly broadened the potential range of threats that could
be used to justify defensive action under Unocal, giving target boards great
1

Id. at 1152.
2mId. at 1150, 1153 (the court also rejected the plaintiff shareholders' argument that the
Time/Warner merger agreement triggered judicial review under Revlon)..
201

d. at 1153.

202 See Id. at 1153 ("[Iln our view, precepts underlying the business judgment rule

militate against a court's engaging in the process of attempting to appraise and evaluate the
relative merits of a long-term versus a short-term investment goal for shareholders. To engage
in such an exercise is a distortion of the Unocal process . . . ."); see also Jeffrey N. Gordon,
Corporations, Markets and Courts, 91 COLUM. L. REv. 1931, 1943 (1991) ( "Paramount
appears to leave no place for the court's independent assessment of the board's assertion that a
hostile bid presents a series of threats that warrant a preclusive response.").
203 Time, Inc., 571 A.2d at 1154-55.
204

d. at 1155.

205 Id.
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leeway in how they choose to deploy their poison pill as a defensive tactic
against unwanted tender offers. In doing so, it ended meaningful judicial
review as part of the first step in the Unocal analysis since Time Inc.
expanded the meaning of "threat" to include a change in business policy
or practices. More broadly, as one of the authors wrote (close to the time
of the decision), Time, Inc. potentially marked "the collapse of heightened
judicial scrutiny for takeover defensive tactics against hostile tender offers
and a retreat to their deferential review under the business judgment
rule." 2 06

D. Unitrin's Weakening ofUnocal 's Second Step
Unocal's two-part inquiry may well be illustrative of an
idiosyncratic holding as the facts of that case fit so perfectly the court's
approach so that its application beyond Unocal's special set of facts is
problematic, at least with respect to the "reasonable relationship" standard.
The first part of the test, essentially the high scrutiny test Delaware
customarily applies to self-dealing transactions, was easily met by
Unocal's board being dominated by outside directors who, at various
points, deliberated and voted without corporate insiders being present and
who were advised by a bevy of legal and financial advisors independent
of Unocal's management. Moreover, their deliberations were measured
and thorough. What sets Unocal apart is the defensive maneuver-a nonpro rata issuer tender offer that was substantially above the hostile bidder's
price. Where the perceived threats were, as they were in Unocal, an
inadequate price and coercion, the natural antidote is an uncoerced
opportunity for shareholders to obtain a fair price, ergo, the defensive
maneuver did bear a reasonable relationship to the threat posed.
Unocal's "reasonable relationship" requirement necessarily invites
similar weighing of threat against response, but once outside the non-pro
rata issuer tender offer response it becomes extremely problematic. Time,
Inc. disingenuously ventured into this factual thicket by concluding that
Time's defensive maneuver-switching from an acquisition that required
shareholder approval, to one that did not-was a reasonable response to
the threat its shareholders could not fully appreciate-the long-term
benefits of combining with Warner. Missing from this thinking is clear
evidence that the great bulk of Time shares were already in the hands of
arbitragers who purchased these shares at a substantially higher value
reflecting the Paramount offer rather than the value the market accorded
to Time in the Time-Warner combination. They knew exactly what they
were doing.
206 Randall S. Thomas, JudicialReview of Defensive Tactics in Proxy Contests: When
is Using a Rights Plan Right?, 46 VAND. L. REv. 503, 517 (1993).
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Because of the natural intrusiveness on the prerogatives of the board
of any "reasonable relationship" standard, it is not surprising that the
Delaware Supreme Court soon diluted Unocal in Unitrin, Inc. v. American
General Corp.20 7 Unitrinreversed the Court of Chancery's application of
Unocal's proportionality review because it "focus[ed] upon whether the
Repurchase Program was an 'unnecessary' defensive response." 208 The
permissiveness of this standard is underscored by the result reached in its
application in Unitrin. Unitrin's articles of incorporation required a vote
of 75 percent of its common shares for any merger with a holder of more
than 15 percent of its stock.209 When American General announced an all
cash tender offer for all Unitrin's stock, the Unitrin board, whose members
collectively owned 23 percent of the stock, adopted a poison pill and
announced the company would buy back shares with the consummate
effect of killing American General's ultimate plan to merge with Unitrin
since with the buyback the Unitrin directors would surely have a veto
under the charter supermajority vote provision. 210 For this reason, the
Chancellor held Unocal'sreasonable relationship standard was violated.2 11
Announcing a different formulation for Unocal's second part, the
Delaware Supreme Court reversed and remanded for further consideration
on whether the repurchase was within the range of reasonable defensive
steps. 2 12 It refocused the test requiring that courts consider whether the
defensive maneuver "was draconian, by being either preclusive or
coercive and; second, if it was not draconian, upon whether it was within
a range of reasonable responses to the threat . . posed." 2 13 Applying the
reformulated standard, the Delaware Supreme Court concluded that the
repurchase was neither preclusive, nor coercive, in light that the record's
finding that American General's tender offer posed a threat of substantive
coercion because of the risk, like that embraced earlier in Time, Inc., that
Unitrin's shareholders were ignorant of the long-term value of current
management's policies.2 14 After Unitrin, delicate or even clumsy
weighing of the threat and the particular defensive step are not part of the
inquiry.
207 651 A.2d 1361 (Del. 1995), rev'g In re Unitrin Inc., S'holder Litig., Civ. A. Nos.
13656, 13699, 1994 WL 698483 (Del. Ch. Oct. 13, 1994).
208 Id. at 1367 (citing Paramount Commc'ns. v. QVC Network, 637 A.2d 34, 45-46
(Del. 1994)).
209
Id. at 1377.
210
Id. at 1368, 1370, 1377.
211

Id.
Id.
213
Id.
214
Id.
212

at 1386, 1391.
at 1391.
at 1367.
at 1384-85.
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E. Airgas and the Costs and Benefits ofUnocal Today
After the Time, Inc. and Unitrin decisions, the use of hostile tender
offers declined markedly.2 15 In their wake, a series of important decisions
clarified the reach of Unocal-Unitrin, further refining the judicial test,216
but largely showing deference to target management's use of defensive
tactics to stop unwanted transactions. The key issue that continued to
attract attention though was whether a target company board could
continue to refuse to redeem an outstanding poison pill with the
consequence that it would permanently preclude its shareholders from
accepting a hostile tender offer (the so-called "Just Say No" defense).
While commentators had for years speculated that such a defense was
permissible under Unocal,217 it was not until Chancellor Chandler issued
his final opinion as a Delaware judge in Air Products and Chemicals, Inc.
v. Airgas, Inc. ("Airgas n"),2 18 that the Delaware Court of Chancery
unambiguously (if dispiritedly) embraced this view.
Delaware's jurisprudence on poison pills arose out of the Delaware
Supreme Court's seminal decision in Moran v. Household International,
Inc., which validated the creation of the poison pill under Delaware law,
but left its use subject to the application of the Unocal test focusing on the
board's decision not to redeem the pill. 219 One crucial aspect of that
decision, especially after Airgas III, is that hostile bidders can seek to
overcome the pill by launching a proxy contest for corporate control to
unseat the incumbent directors and to replace them with directors that are
willing to redeem the pill and permit shareholders to accept a pending
tender offer. 2 20 The proxy contest was a viable takeover approach in that
case because, among other things, the board of Household International
was not classified and therefore all directors stood for election each year.
However, in Airgas III, the court was confronted by a situation
where the target company was determined to keep its poison pill intact and
215 GILSON AND BLACK, supra note 100, at 15.
216 See, e.g., Williams v. Geier, 671 A.2d 1368 (Del. 1996) (holding that Unocal only

applies to defensive tactics that are adopted unilaterally by the board of directors).
217 See e.g., Lipton, supra note 155 (arguing as one of the earliest commentators to

advance the propriety of the "just say no" approach). At the other end of the spectrum are
commentators favoring absolute management passivity in the face of a takeover bid. See, e.g.,
Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of Target's Management in

Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 Harv. L. Rev. 1161, 1194-204 (1981) (arguing passivity is
necessary as defensive maneuvers reduce shareholder value).
218 Air Products and Chemicals, Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., 16 A.3d 48 (Del. Ch. 2011). Earlier
portions of this litigation discussed infra, Part IV.C.
219 Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985).
220 Airgas III, 16 A3d at 96.
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had the advantage of also having a classified board in place.221 The bidder
challenged this combination of defenses as violating Unitrin's ban on
preclusive defensive tactics.2 22 In rejecting this argument, the Chancellor
quoted the Delaware Supreme Court's decision just four months earlier in
Versata Enterprises v. Selectica: "the combination of a classified board
and a Rights plan do[es] not constitute a preclusive defense." 223
Recognizing this point, the Chancellor concluded in his final opinion that
"the poison pill's limits remain to be seen." 224
As the capstone on a long line of cases permitting boards to make
full use of the poison pill against unwanted tender offers, Airgas III is the
most dramatic example of upholding the "Just Say No" defense. While it
is consistent with Time, Inc.'s evisceration of the Unocal threat analysis,
and Unitrin'sretreat from judicial review of the second prong of Unocal,
it puts an exclamation point on the collapse of Unocal review of a target
board's use of the poison pill.
V. BLASIUS: MODERATING THE SPHERE OF A BOARD' S AUTHORITY

Modem corporate statutes mirror the DGCL's provision that "[t]he
business and affairs of every corporation . . shall be managed by or under
the direction of a board of directors," unless the corporate statute or the
articles of incorporation otherwise provide. 22 5 Articles rarely qualify this
broad grant of authority and corporate statutes condition only a handful of
actions on a concurring vote of the stockholders. Indeed, even changing
the articles of incorporation, the most fundamental document in the
relationship between owners and managers, cannot be initiated by the
shareholders; any change in that organic document must be initiated by the
board of directors. 2 26 Thus, the shareholder's prerogative, their franchise,
is tightly limited to qualified inspection rights, voting on matters submitted
by the board for their approval, nominating directors and suing for
2

21 Id. at 62.
2Id. at 113. Data supports the claim that the poison pill coupled with a classified board

22

adds greatly to the pill's potency.. See Lucian Ayre Bebchuk, et. al., The PowerfulAntitakeover
Force ofStaggeredBoards: Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 54 Stan. L. Rev. 887, 930-31 (2002)
(finding that classified boards raise the likelihood of a company remaining independent from
thirty-four percent to sixty-one percent over a company having only a poison pill).
223 Airgas III, 16 A.3d at 114 (quoting Versata Enters. v. Selectica, 5 A.3d 586, 604
(Del. 2010)).
224
Id. at 126.
225 DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 141(a); see also Model Bus. Corp. Act anno. § 8.02 cmt. (2013)
(collecting statutes state jurisdictions addressing qualifications of directors and delegations to
the board).
226 See, e.g., DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 242(b)(1); Model Bus. Corp. Act anno. §10.03(a).
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misconduct or failures to comply with statutory or internal requirements
for action. This narrow limit of powers reflects the well-recognized virtue
of the corporate entity, centralization of authority over the company's
affairs.
A. Blasius Industries and the Divide ofAuthority Between Management
and Shareholders
Against this tapestry, Blasius Industries, Inc. v. Atlas Corp.
("Blasius"), 227 projects a bright light on the divide between the board's and
the shareholders' spheres of authority, and how, just as the prerogatives of
the board to act within its broad sphere of influence are protected, the
limited domains within which shareholders are permitted to act are also
protected by equity. Blasius's facts are relatively straightforward. Upon
learning that a substantial block holder was engaged in a written consent
solicitation to expand the Atlas board and fill the resulting eight vacancies,
the Atlas directors themselves pre-emptively added two directors to its
By filling these two positions, Atlas' board
staggered board.228
temporarily blocked Blasius Industries' quest to grab control of Atlas
Corporation.22 9
Chancellor Allen, despite holding that the Atlas board acted in good
faith in defending control, found that the board's actions were beyond the
protection of the business judgment rule.2 30 The Chancellor reasoned that
by filling the vacancies the Atlas directors were not acting solely to
manage the company's business but were instead taking action that
impacted the boundaries of the relationship between principal and agent
"with respect to a matter of internal corporate governance." 23 1 In his eyes,
the well-established presumptions of propriety that directors enjoy when
acting with respect to their management and oversight of the corporation's
affairs did not carryforward to the directors' intrusion into the principalagent relationship.232 The Blasius court therefore required the Atlas
directors to make a stronger showing than acting in a good faith belief
about what was in the best interest of the corporation; instead the court
required the directors to bear the burden of proving a "compelling
227 564 A.2d 651 (Del. Ch. 1988).
22 I1d. at 654-55.

" Id. at 655. Atlas had classified its board so that only one-third ofthe directors stood
for election in any year. Under the DGCL, directors of a classified board can only be removed
"for cause," see DEL. CODE tit. 8 § 141(k) (i), so this provision prevented a majority vote of the
Atlas shareholders from removing a sufficient number of directors to change control.
23 0 Id. at 660.
231 Id.

232 See id
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justification" for thwarting the on-going shareholder efforts to elect or
Significantly, the justification that must be
nominate directors.233
advanced by the board is not a purpose narrowly focused on whether the
corporation's interest is advanced by management's unilateral
interdiction; the required compelling justification instead must be
anchored by how, under the circumstances, the board's action furthers the
shareholders' franchise.234 Allen reasoned:
A board's decision to act to prevent the shareholders from
creating a majority of new board positions and filling them
does not involve the exercise of the corporation'spower over
its property, or with respect to its rights or obligations; rather,
it involves allocation, between shareholders as a class and the
board, of effective power with respect to governance of the
corporation ... .Action designed principally to interfere with
the effectiveness of a vote inevitably involves a conflict
between the board and a shareholder majority. Judicial review
of such action involves a determination of the legal and
equitable obligations of an agent towards his principal. This
is not, in my opinion, a question that a court may leave to the
agent finally to decide so long as he does so honestly and
competently; that is, it may not be left to the agent's business
judgment.23 5
Blasius's facts underscore the dichotomy between the board's
prerogatives to manage the corporation and restrictions on the board's acts
that intrude beyond that sphere and into that of the shareholders' limited
prerogatives. As stated earlier, Chancellor Allen held that the Atlas board
acted in good faith as their defensive steps were to further what the board
believed was best for Atlas, namely to continue the ongoing business plan
and not undergo the leveraged recapitalization plan being championed by
Blasius Industries. 2 36 Despite this finding, the Chancellor held that a
legitimate corporate purpose was not by itself sufficient to justify the

3

Id. at 661-62.

234 See id. at 663.

2 Id. at 660. In a subsequent opinion, Chancellor Allen appeared to erode the
significance of Blasius by explaining it merely reflects "the high value that prior cases had
placed upon the exercise of voting rights and the inherently particularized and contextual nature
of any inquiry concerning fiduciary duties" so that it did not represent new law. Stahl v. Apple
Bancorp Inc., 579 A2d 1115, 1122 (Del. Ch. 1990), reprintedin 16 DEL. J. CoRP. L. 909.
36 Blasius, 564 A.2d at 663.
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board's actions that had the correlative effect of impacting the franchise
of shareholders.237
Blasius adhered to the wise observation that "agents whose interests
may materially diverge from the interests of their principals should not
have the power to unilaterally determine or materially vary the rules that
govern those divergences of interests."238 It is beyond question that within
the principal-agent sphere, their relationship and the methods for selecting
and controlling the agent are defined by the principal and not the agent.
This is a central tenet of the law of agency. As seen above, the board's
authority with respect to "[t]he business and affairs of every
corporation" 239 arises from the corporate statute, and not from the
shareholders; hence, the non-corporate business and affairs necessarily
rest, as Blasius holds, on policies that underlie the principal-agent
relationship. To this end, as Blasius illustrates, managerial actions that
impact the owners' ability to pursue the limited powers owners have to
discipline managers-sell, suffrage, or sue-are not just of a different
order of magnitude, they are within an entirely different sphere of
corporate law, namely governance, and beyond the fiduciary constraints
that pertain to the board's management or oversight of "[t]he business and
affairs of every corporation." 2 40 As concluded in Blasius, when the board
acts not within its managerial sphere, but within the franchise naturally
arising from the principal-agent relationship, the board's actions must be
regarded jealously. 241 Accordingly, Blasius judged the Atlas board's
actions by a very different standard than applies to questions of
management's stewardship of the firm's business.
Even though the specific areas of the shareholder franchise are quite
limited-to vote, to nominate, to inspect corporate records, and to sell
shares-Blasius'sunvarnished holding had the great potential to strengthen
shareholder protection in each of these areas. As developed below, Blasius
never achieved its potential as the Delaware courts not only cabined its
scope, but did so quickly by ignoring its powerful insights that distinguish
board actions over corporate matters and those that intrude into the realm
of shareholder rights.
7

Id. at 658-63.

238 See, e.g., Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Structure of CorporationLaw, 89 COLuM. L.

REv. 1461, 1474 (1989); see also Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise,
93 VA. L. REv. 675, 709-10 (2007) ("[I]t is necessary to constrain board-adopted election

bylaws that opt out of the provided default arrangement to make it more difficult to replace
incumbent directors."). We share the position of Professor Bebchuk in concluding there should
be less scrutiny whenever a bylaw that impacts the shareholder franchise is approved by the
shareholders.
9
DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 141(a).
240 id.
241

Blasius, 564 A.2d at 662-63.
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B. The Delaware Courts Quickly ContainBlasius
The Delaware Supreme Court bluntly cabined Blasius in Stroud v.
Grace 242 and Williams v. Geier,243 in which it restricted Blasius to
unilateral action by a board that interfered with but a single franchise
enjoyed by shareholders, that is, the right to vote. 2 " Other traditional areas
of the shareholder franchise, examined more closely below-the right to
sue, to obtain information and to sell shares-are unprotected by Blasius.
Nonetheless, Blasius's reach is potentially extensive not just because
voting is a regular event in the corporate setting but because voting-linked
issues are central to legal skirmishes in change in control settings.
However, even these potential areas of regulation by Blasius,
circumscribed by Blasius's self-imposed requirements that the board must
act for the primary purpose 245 of thwarting 2 " the voting franchise 247 and
do so when the shareholder is exercising the right, 248 have in combination
limited the protections Blasius can provide. Nonetheless it continues to
242

606 A.2d 75 (Del. 1992).

243 671 A.2d 1368 (Del. 1996).
244 Corporate actions that adversely impact the voting franchise following a board

recommendation are beyond Blasius when approved by the shareholders. See e.g., Stroud, 606
A.2d 75 (involving advance notice bylaw proposed by board and approved by shareholders).
245 See Johnston v. Pedersen, 28 A.3d 1079, 1083 (Del. Ch. 2011) (pending election
contest "loomed like the sword of Damocles ..... over the directors engineered loan transaction
that conferred greater voting power to themselves); Yucaipa Am. All. Fund II, L.P. v. Riggio, 1
A.3d 310, 330-31 (Del. Ch. 2010) (purpose in adopting pill was to protect shareholders from
inordinate influence of two funds who were rapidly accumulating shares and not for purpose of
disenfranchising the funds), affd, 15 A.3d 218 (Del. 2011) (unpublished table decision).
246 See, e.g., In re MONY Group, 853 A.2d 661 (Del. Ch. 2004) (delaying the record
date for approval of a merger so as to enfranchise more recent shareholders outside Blasius);H.
F. Ahmanson & Co. v. Great W. Fin. Corp., CIV. A. 15650, 1997 WL 305824 (Del. Ch. June 3,
1997) (holding advancement of the stockholder meeting date did not to interfere with
shareholders' ability to oppose the action), reprinted in 23 DEL. J. CoRP. L. 633. Similarly,
board action that delays shareholder action is likely to be upheld under Blasius as delay is not
sufficient frustration ofshareholder action. See, e.g., Kidsco, Inc. v. Dinsmore, 674 A.2d 483,
496 (Del. Ch. 1995) (upholding board amending bylaw that delayed special meeting at which
hostile bidder would seek to remove directors).
247 There are numerous characterization issues inherent to Blasius's focus on voting.
Thus, refusal to re-nominate a director does not trigger Blasius. Dolgoff v. Projectavision, No.
Civ.A. 14805, 1996 WL 91945 (Del. Ch. Feb. 29, 1996) reprintedin 21 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1128.
A defensive maneuver to place a block of voting shares with a supporter is not seen as intruding
into the shareholder voting franchise but instead directed toward impacting the marketplace for
control and not voting at a meeting. Shamrock Holdings, Inc. v. Polaroid Corp., 559 A.2d 278
(Del. Ch. 1989).
248 See, e.g., In re Gaylord Container Corp. S'holder Litig., 753 A.2d 462 (Del. Ch.
2000) (adopting supervoting rules when there was no contest for control on going escapes
Blasius scrutiny).
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have a role, albeit one heavily circumscribed, in control contests, although
the courts' rhetoric is more likely to denigrate than to venerate the
decision.
The most revealing of the unease with Blasius appears in an article
co-written by the opinion's author, Chancellor William Allen. The article
argues that the Blasius inquiry is but an extension of the reasonableness
inquiry embraced by Unocal-Unitrin so that there is no justification for
layering onto that standard a demanding "compelling justification"
showing. 249
Blasius reaffirmed the traditional view that director actions
primarily motivated to effect a disenfranchisement have a dim
chance of being sustained .

.

.. [P]ost-Blasius experience has

shown that presentations to the court were not made clearer,
nor were helpful analytical solutions . .. by the addition of a

Blasius argument to a brief that already included a Unocal
argument. The reason is that after Unitrin, it is difficult to
unearth or even imagine a case that would be decided
differently if the analysis were conducted under the Blasius
rather than the Unocal standard. 250
Allen and his coauthors suggest that Blasius is but a subpart of the already
greatly weakened Unocal analysis. 251 To consider Blasius as subtext to
Unocal robs it of its special focus of protecting the limited areas in which
the shareholders' franchise exists. The authors' oversight is confounding
board actions that impede the shareholder franchise with board actions
over the corporation's affairs.
Consistent with the above quote, Delaware courts have generally
folded Blasius's review into Unocal review.25 2 Lost in the decanting of
249 William T. Allen, et al., Function Over Form: A Reassessment of Standards of
Review in Delaware Corporation Law, 56 Bus. LAW. 1287, 1312-16 (2001). For earlier
evidence of reducing the effect of Blasius, see Chesapeake Corp. v. Shore, 771 A.2d 293 (Del.
Ch. 2000) (then-Vice Chancellor Strine holds after extensive analysis that parallels much of the
article published a year later that the preferred approach is to examine alleged
disenfranchisement under Unocal and proceed to Blasius only if the board's action violates
Unocal so that if there is a compelling justification, the board's action would be upheld).
25o Allen, supra note 249 at 1311-12.
m The article was co-authored with Allen by former Chancellor and current Delaware
Supreme Court Chief Justice Leo E. Strine, Jr., and Jack B. Jacobs, former Vice-Chancellor and
former Delaware Supreme Court Justice.
252 See, e.g., Third Point LLC v. Ruprecht, C.A. No. 9469-VCP, 2014 WL 1922029, at
*16 (Del. Ch. May 2, 2014) (rights plan adopted in response to rapid increase in stock ownership
by hedge funds not examined under Blasius so long as proxy contest remains a viable option);
Kallick v. Sandridge Energy, Inc., 68 A.3d 242 (Del. Ch. 2013) (Blasiusdeemed an unhelpful
review standard so that in evaluating "proxy put" granted bondholders, Unocal is a more
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Blasius is its prescience: there is a difference of spheres of authority
between a board acting within clear areas of authority it enjoys, such as
issuing stock, proposing action for shareholders to approve that affects
their voting power, and setting meeting dates that facilitate shareholder
voice, and actions that are taken with the transparent purpose of thwarting
an ongoing exercise of the shareholder to nominate or seek the election of
directors. Contrary to the judges' thesis, Blasius can hardly be viewed as
redundant to a Unocal-Unitrin analysis. Recall that Chancellor Allen,
while striking down the Atlas board's defensive actions in Blasius,
nevertheless upheld those same actions under Unocal. Furthermore, as
seen earlier, Unitrin weakened Unocal's standard; it is therefore illogical
to believe that Blasius's holding on whether Unocal was satisfied would
have been decided differently today in light of Unitrin.
As is the case with any specialized duty, courts must grapple with
difficult characterization questions in determining what review standard is
to be applied. This task is not unique to Blasius. We find post-Blasius
decisions clarify that Blasius is not invoked when the challenged board
action has only an incidental impact on voting. 25 For example, a rights
plan that prevented a single holder from accumulating more than twenty
percent of the total voting power is not judged by the Blasius' compelling
justification standard.25 4 It is the requirement that the board's actions have
as their primary purpose interfering with a then on-going effort to
nominate or elect directors that sets Blasius apart and as such has had the
greatest limiting effect on its scope. The litmus regarding purpose and
whether there is an on-going effort to nominate or vote are inherently
appropriate standard), reprintedin 38 DEL. J. CORP. L. 677; Keyser v. Curtis, C.A. No. 7109VCN, 2012 WL 3115453, at *12 (Del. Ch. July 31, 2012) (Blasius is mere reiteration of Unocal),
aff'd sub nom. Poliak v. Keyser, 65 A.3d 617 (Del. 2013) (unpublished table decision); Yucaipa
Am. All. Fund II, L.P. v. Rigio, 1 A.3d 310 (Del. Ch. 2010) (Unocal and not Blasius applied in
adoption ofpoison pill in the face of two individuals acquiring significant holdings in company);
Mercier v. Inter-Tel, Inc., 929 A.2d 786, 810-13 (Del. Ch. 2007) (compelling justification
requirement applied only if the board's action in postponing vote on merger was outside the
protection unreasonable and precluded shareholders from voting); Aquila, Inc. v. Quanta Servs.,
805 A.2d 196 (Del. Ch. 2002) (rejecting Blasius and applying Unocal to uphold board allocating
approximately ten percent of the voting shares to an employee trust in the face of a hostile bid);
Hills Stores Co. v. Bozic, 769 A.2d 88, 103-04 (Del. Ch. 2000) (adoption of severance
agreements in the face of takeover are reviewed under Unocal and Revlon and there is no need
to layer that analysis with Blasius), reprintedin 26 DEL. J. CORP. L. 365.
253 Stahl v. Apple Bancorp, Inc., 579 A.2d 1115, 1123 (Del. Ch. 1990) (the interference
must be on a scale that interferes or impedes the effective exercise of voting), reprintedin 16
DEL. J. CORP. L. 909. Thus, most challenges to changing, particularly delaying the date for a
shareholder vote, are beyond Blasius. See e.g., In re MONY Group, Inc. S'holder Litig., 853
A.2d 661 (Del. Ch. 2004).
25 Yucaipa Am. Alliance Fund II, L.P. v. Riggio, 1 A.3d 310 (Del. Ch.), aff'd, 15 A.3d
218 (Del. 2011) (unpublished table decision).
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factual, but no more so than what is coercive, preclusive, or within a range
of reasonable defensive maneuvers. Thus, lamenting that Blasius poses
difficult factual issues appears to ignore that these factual inquiries goes
to the very heart of the standard itself, namely a necessary protection of
the voting franchise of shareholders.
C. Blasius, Advance Notice Bylaws and Alternative JudicialApproaches
Blasius's regulatory absence, due to the primary purpose litmus, is
most glaring in the ever-expanding area of advance notice bylaws.
Generally, stockholders are not required to give advance notice in order to
introduce business or nominate directors at an annual meeting, unless the
corporation has explicitly imposed such a requirement via an advance
notice bylaw.255 In the case of director nominations, such bylaws also
often require that shareholders provide certain specified information about
the nominees.2 56 Advance notice bylaws have now become a standard
fixture within U.S. companies.257 They are frequently upheld by both
Delaware courts2 58 and courts of other jurisdictions, and have been for
many years. 259
Advance notice bylaws have two purposes: to ensure the orderly
functioning of shareholder meetings260 and to be used as a defensive
strategy against activist shareholders. 2 6' The former is achieved by
ensuring that shareholders can prepare and inform themselves prior to a

25s JANA Master Fund, Ltd. v. CNET Networks, Inc., 954 A.2d 335, 344 (Del. Ch.
2008) (citing DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 222(a)), reprintedin 33 DEL. J. CORP. L. 565, affd, 947 A.2d
1120 (Del. 2008) (unpublished table decision); Openwave Sys. Inc. v. Harbinger Capital
Partners Master Fund I, Ltd., 924 A.2d 228, 238 (Del. Ch. 2007).
256 Openwave Sys. Inc., 924 A.2d at 238-39.
25E.g., Id. at 238-39 (citing Mentor Graphics Corp. v. Quickturn Design Sys., Inc., 728
A.2d 25, 43 (Del. Ch. 1998), aff'd on other grounds sub nom. Quickturn Design Sys., Inc. v.
Shapiro, 721 A.2d 1281 (Del. 1998)) (noting that advance notice bylaws are "commonplace" in
Delaware corporations); Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Commentaries on Delaware's Choice:
DirectorNominations, 39 DEL. J. CORP. L. 117, 136 (2014).
258 See, e.g., Openwave Sys. Inc., 924 A.2d at 239 ("Advance notice bylaws are often
construed and frequently upheld as valid by Delaware courts." (citing Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen.
Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1388 n. 38 (Del. 1995))); Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d 75, 95 (Del. 1992)
(ruling that the advanced bylaws were valid); Accipiter Life Scis. Fund, L.P. v. Helfer, 905 A.2d
115, 127 (Del. Ch. 2006) (ruling that the ten day advance notice provision of the bylaws was
valid).
2 Hamermesh, supra note 257, at 137.
260 Openwave Sys. Inc., 924 A.2d at 239.
261 See AARON RACHELSON, Management's Defensive Strategy: Prior to
Commencement of A Proxy Contest-Revise the Corporation's Bylaws, in CORPORATE
ACQUISITIONS, MERGERS AND DIVESTITURES § 1:161 (2017) (suggesting that corporate
management consider amending bylaws to include a notice requirement as a defensive strategy).
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vote.262 The latter is achieved by allowing the incumbent board time to
mount a defensive strategy against insurgents.263 Because they deal with
a shareholder's voting franchise, they should fall within Blasius at least
whenever the advance notice bylaw is adopted when a shareholder is in
the process of exercising that right.
In an era where the prevalent theme within corporate law is private
ordering in which the bylaws are the medium for fulfilling that objective,
Delaware courts have thus far avoided taking an exclusively contractual
focus when considering challenges to advance notice bylaws. Courts
pursue a blended approach considering both contract interpretation
principles and equitable circumstances in judging the applicability and
validity of advance notice bylaws. Surprisingly, in most cases, Blasius is
not a focal point, even when the board acts unilaterally. For example, in
Mentor Graphics Corp. v. Quickturn Design Sys., Inc., the court upheld a
ninety day advance notice bylaw that had been adopted unilaterally by the
target's board of directors in response to Mentor Graphics' tender offer;
before the amendment, Quickturn's bylaws, while authorizing holders of
ten percent of the company's shares to convene a special stockholders'
meeting, were unclear regarding who would set the meeting date and how
quickly such a meeting would be convened. 26
Mentor Graphics challenged the board-adopted bylaw under
Blasius as well as Unocal. The challenge was rebuffed as Vice-Chancellor
Jacobs upheld the bylaw, believing the board's response was a reasonable
step to avoid having a special shareholders meeting convened with
insufficient time for the shareholders to adequately inform themselves
regarding the action proposed to be taken at the meeting.26 5 While finding
this explanation reasonable, Mentor Graphics did not separately evaluate
the bylaw under the Blasius compelling justification standard.266 Mentor
Graphics clearly illustrates Delaware courts shunning Blasius by
essentially substituting the more permissive Unocal standard for the more
probing protections of the shareholder franchise to vote.
Indeed, Delaware's protective veil for the shareholder franchise in
the context of advance notice bylaws largely occurs independently of
Blasius. Rather than invoke Blasius, courts narrowly construe the scope
of a challenged advance notice bylaw so as not to unnecessarily erode the
262 Openwave Sys. Inc., 924 A.2d at 238-39.
263 RACHELSON, supranote 261, § 1:161.
26 See Mentor Graphics Corp. v. Quickturn Design Sys., Inc., 728 A.2d 25 (Del. Ch.),
aff'd on other grounds sub nom. Quickturn Design Sys., Inc. v. Shapiro, 721 A.2d 1281 (Del.
1998). 265
Id. at 40-43.
266
Id. at 44.
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shareholders' voting rights. Thus, in JANA Master Fund, Ltd v. CNET
Networks, Inc. the plaintiff ("JANA") informed the board of defendant
CNET Networks, Inc. ("CNET") that it wished to solicit proxies for its
director nominees and various proposals. 267 CNET's notice bylaws
required a shareholder seeking to nominate directors, or to propose other
business at the annual meeting, to have beneficially owned $1,000 of
common stock for not less than one year.268 Because JANA had only
acquired its shares eight months prior to the expected date of the meeting,
CNET contended that JANA's planned proxy solicitation was in violation
of the bylaws. 269 The notice bylaw also stated that notice must "comply
with the federal securities laws governing shareholder proposals a
corporation must include in its own proxy materials." 270 The court held
that this language clearly indicated that the bylaw only applied to
proposals and nominations that are to be included in the company's proxy
materials.27 1 Since JANA intended to finance the proxy mailings itself,
the court concluded that the bylaw was inapplicable.272
Another approach that avoids Blasius scrutiny or even a review that
is premised on the importance of protecting the sanctity of the shareholder
franchise is by courts more ambiguously basing their decision on the
ground that directors acted inequitably in their steadfast invocation of an
advance notice bylaw when there has been a material change of
circumstances after the advance notice bylaw deadline has passed.2 73 In
such cases, the board has a duty to waive the advance notice requirement,
and a failure to do so means that the bylaw has been "applied
inequitably." 27 4 For example, in Hubbard v. Hollywood Park Realty
Enterprises, Inc., the original shareholder-plaintiff, dissatisfied with
management and wanting to change the direction of the company, sought
to enjoin two sister-companies from enforcing their respective advance
notice bylaws. 275
Following the suit's initiation, the dissatisfied
shareholder and the board of one of the companies reached an agreement
settling their differences; the board expanded and nominated a committee
whose members supported a change in the firm's direction.2 76 In response,
267 954 A.2d 335, 337 (Del. Ch.), reprinted in 33 DEL. J. CORP. L. 565, aff'd, 947 A.2d
1120 (Del.
268 2008) (unpublished table decision).
1 d at 337-39.
1 6 1Id at 337.
270
Id at 340.
271 Id. at 346.
272
Id at 343.
273 Hubbard v. Hollywood Park Realty Enters., Inc., Civ. A. No. 11779, 1991 WL 3151,
at *12 (Del. Ch. Jan. 4, 1991), reprinted in 17 DEL. J. CORP. L. 238.
274 Id. at *12-13.
275
id. at *1.
276 Id. at *3.
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the directors of the sister company moved for an injunction to restrain the
company from enforcing the advance notice bylaw as to them. 277 The
court found that the post-deadline agreement constituted a material change
in circumstances and noted that generally, such changes would
"foreseeably generate controversy and shareholder opposition., 278 The
court thus concluded that, under such circumstances, "considerations of
fairness and the fundamental importance of the shareholder franchise
dictated that the shareholders be afforded a fair opportunity to nominate
an opposing slate, thus imposing upon the board the duty to waive the
advance notice requirement of the bylaw." 279 The court described its
holding and its finding of a duty as "purely equitable" even though the
board "has acted in good faith and took no steps overtly to change the
electoral rules themselves." 2 80
As Hubbard suggests, when determining whether factual issues
qualify as a material change in circumstances in the context of advance
notice bylaws, the guiding inquiry is whether the change is a fundamental
deviation from the company's prior position that, if known before the
deadline, would have foreseeably generated controversy and led to the
nomination of a dissident slate. 28 1 Thus, a court will only find such a
material change in circumstances in extraordinary cases.282
Another example of such an extraordinary situation is Icahn
Partnersv. Amylin Pharmaceuticals,Inc., where a shareholder sought to
enjoin the board from enforcing an advance notice bylaw, when after the
time set forth in the bylaw, the board had summarily rejected a proposed
acquisition that would have resulted in a significant premium for
shareholders. 283 The court concluded that the proposed acquisition and the
board's lack of consideration constituted a material change in
circumstances sufficient to impose upon the board a duty to waive the
bylaw requirements. 2 84 The court's rationale was that the stockholders
277

278 Id.

1

279

at *10.
d at *12.

Id.

280 Id.

281 See id.; Icahn Partners L.P. v. Amylin Pharm., Inc. ("Icahn"), C.A. No. 7404-VCN,

2012 WL 1526814, at *2 (Del. Ch. Apr. 20, 2012).
282 See Accipiter Life Scis. Fund, L.P. v. Helfer, 905 A.2d 115, 125-26 (Del. Ch. 2006)
(granting defendant company's motion for summary judgment on the basis that plaintiff could
have preserved its nomination rights with reasonable diligence by simply reading a press release,
which was both issued publicly and filed as an attachment to Form 8-K announcing the annual
meeting, thus triggering the advance notice requirements, and noting that those facts fall short
of the types of inequity evident in the cases on which plaintiff relied, all of which were based on
"extraordinary facts").
283 Icahn, 2012 WL 1526814, at *2.
284
Id. at *3.
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might have forever lost the opportunity to sell their stock at such a large
premium if they did not have the opportunity to elect a different board.285
In other words, the waiver was necessary as the shareholders would have
otherwise been "denied the opportunity to exercise their voting rights at
an arguably critical time."286
Hubbard and Icahn each required waiver of an advance notice
bylaw because of a material development that occurred after the date,
which the bylaw required the shareholder seeking action at an upcoming
meeting to give notice. Absent such intervening facts, the bylaw's
application turns on rules of construction that Delaware has developed for
advance notice bylaws. The starting point is whether the bylaw is clear in
its scope and requirements. This inquiry, as stated earlier, historically was
founded on a firm protection of the shareholder franchise by narrowly
construing the scope of the bylaw.287 As illustrated in JANA MasterFund
discussed earlier, plaintiffs benefit by courts strictly construing the' scope
of the advance notice bylaw.288 JANA Master Fund, by virtue of the
bylaw's casual reference to the federal proxy rules, held that advance
notice was not necessary when the shareholder would not resort to
management's proxy statement as a means to reach other shareholders. 289
285

1d.

Id.; Cf Sherwood v. Chan Tze Ngon, C.A. No. 7106-VCP, 2011 WL 6355209, at
*14 (Del. Ch. Dec. 16, 2011) (noting, in the context of board's removal of a current board
member from its slate of nominees after issuance of proxy and the advance notice deadline, that
"[t]he board should have foreseen that acting in this manner would generate controversy" and
that the shareholders "would lose the opportunity to express their fully informed views on that
controversy in a fair election" unless actions were taken to alleviate the effects of the board's
decision, and consequently granted plaintiffs TRO request).
287 Openwave Sys. Inc. v. Harbinger Capital Partners Master Fund I, Ltd., 924 A.2d 228,
234-35 (Del. Ch. 2007) ("in construing bylaws Delaware law requires interpretation in favor of
shareholder rights"). Openwave Systems involved two bylaws that each mandated a different
deadline for shareholders to give notice of their actions at an upcoming meeting. Id. The court
viewed the bylaws as poorly drafted and held that being sensitive to the shareholder franchise
compelled it to hold plaintiff need comply with only one of the two specified deadlines.
However, the plaintiff did not prevail since the plaintiff took no steps under either bylaw. Id. at
243-44.
288 JANA Master Fund, Ltd. v. CNET Networks, Inc., 954 A.2d 335, 340 (Del. Ch.)
reprinted in 33 DEL. J. CORP. L. 565, aff'd, 947 A.2d 1120 (Del. 2008) (unpublished table
decision).
289
Id. at 345-45; see also Levitt Corp., v. Office Depot, Inc., C.A. No. 3622-VCN, 2008
WL 1724244 (Del. Ch. Apr. 14, 2008), reprintedin 33 DEL. J. CORP. L. 579. Office Depot, Inc.
had sent a proxy statement and notice of annual meeting to the shareholders informing them that
twelve directors were to be elected at the meeting. Id. at *1. Levitt Corp. filed its own proxy
materials with the SEC, but did not give advance notice to Office Depot of its intention to
nominate directors. Id. at *2. The issue before the court was whether Office Depot's bylaw that
required advance notice of "business" to be brought before the annual meeting prevented Levitt
from achieving its objectives at the forthcoming meeting. Id. at *6. The court concluded that,
even though the term "business" includes the nomination of directors, the bylaw did not prevent
Levitt from nominating directors and voting for its nominees because Office Depot had fulfilled
2
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Similarly, the Delaware Supreme Court held that the "plain meaning" of a
bylaw requiring nominations be made by "the date" specified in the notice
of the meeting, required a specific date be identified and was not triggered
by notice that the shareholder meeting would occur "on or about a
particular date." 290
Some tension exists between the shareholder franchise and
obeisance to private ordering in Delaware's contemporary handling of
advance notice bylaws disputes where the bylaw scope is ambiguous. The
historical-franchise protective approach to such ambiguity was to accord
the ambiguous bylaw a construction that favors the voting franchise.
However, developments in addressing bylaw disputes that do not involve
advance notice bylaws are now influencing the courts' construction of
advance notice bylaws. In resolving the scope of bylaw disputes involving
orthodox matters, courts have allowed the parties to introduce extrinsic
evidence on the intended meaning and scope of the particular bylaw. This
historically has not occurred with advance notice bylaws. However, more
recently Delaware courts have expressed a greater willingness to find
bylaw language ambiguous and consider extrinsic evidence of meaning.
The shift is most apparent in the Delaware Court of Chancery and
Delaware Supreme Court involving Airgas, Inc. v. Air Products
Chemicals, Inc. ("Airgas I" & "Airgas II," respectively) decisions. 291 In
that dispute, shareholders adopted a bylaw amendment to hold the plaintiff
corporation's annual meeting seven months earlier than it had been
traditionally held.292 The courts considered whether the amendment was
validly adopted under the corporation's charter and whether the
amendment itself impermissibly cut short some directors' "full term" on a
staggered board as established by the charter and Delaware law. 293 Both
issues turned on the proper interpretation of "full term," "annual," and
"year." 2 94 Departing from the reluctance of earlier courts to find ambiguity
the bylaw requirement by itself giving notice of this business to be conducted at the meeting.
Id. at *6-7.
290
Hl Int'l Inc. v. Opportunity Partners, L.P., 119 A.3d 30, 39 (Del. 2015). In Hill, a
proxy statement was issued stating the company's annual meeting was "anticipated"to occur
"on or about June 10, 2015." Id. at 34 (emphasis in original). The court held that the
approximate time frame did not satisfy the "prior public disclosure of the date" requirement
pursuant to the bylaws. Id. at 39-40.
291 Airgas, Inc. v. Air Prods. & Chems., Inc., 8 A.3d 1182 (Del. 2010), rev'g, Civil
Action No. 5817-CC, 2010 WL 3960599 (Del. Ch. Oct. 8, 2010). Although not directly advance
notice bylaw cases, these decisions address how bylaws may affect shareholder electoral rights
and apply the same principles of construction. Later portions of this litigation discussed supra,
Part EI.E.
29
AirgasI, 2010 WL 3960599, at *1.
293
294

id.
Id. at *6.
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in bylaws, both courts found the language was ambiguous.29 5 The
Delaware Court of Chancery and the Delaware Supreme Court, however,
diverged on their approaches.2 96 After concluding that the corporation's
charter and the words' ordinary meanings did not resolve the ambiguity,
the Chancellor held that, because shareholders had voted for the
amendment, the proper construction was that which allowed the
amendment to be upheld.2 97 As a result, the court upheld the bylaw
amendments and found in favor of the defendants.2 98 In contrast, the
Delaware Supreme Court moved even farther away from earlier decisions
by consulting extensive extrinsic evidence, such as industry practice, the
ABA's Model Forms and Commentary, and early twentieth century
corporate literature. 2" Each of these sources indicated that corporations
with staggered boards typically intended directors' terms to last a full three
years and that the industry followed the same interpretation the plaintiffs
were advancing.30 0 The court determined this "overwhelming and
uncontroverted extrinsic evidence" resolved the ambiguity in favor of the
plaintiff, and thus it rejected the Chancellor's pro-shareholder
construction.301
Additionally, in Sherwood v. Chan Tze Ngon, the plaintiff sought
to enjoin a corporation from holding its annual meeting until shareholders
had adequate time to consider the plaintiffs slate of nominees and
corrections to earlier disclosures.30 2 Wile deciding the case on other
grounds, the court signaled in dicta that the advance notice bylaw's failure
to state whether postponement of the annual meeting reset the notice
period made the bylaw "at least ambiguous" 30 3 and reviewed extrinsic
evidence on industry practice that might help resolve the ambiguity. 3 04
295 Id. at *7; Airgas II, 8 A.3d at 1189.
296 Airgas II, 8 A.3d at 1189 ("We agree with the Court of Chancery that the relevant

Charter language is ambiguous. But as more fully discussed below, there is overwhelming
extrinsic evidence that under the Annual Meeting Term Alternative adopted by Airgas, a term
of three years was intended.").
2
9 AirgasI, 2010 WL 3960599 at *13-14.
298 i
29

Airgas II, 8 A.3d at 1190-92.
id.
31
Id. at 1194.
302 C.A. No. 7106-VCP, 2011 WL 6355209, at *1 (Del. Ch. Dec. 20, 2011).
s' Id. at *11.
"The Court explained:
300

For example, Hewlett-Packard Co.'s notice bylaw states expressly that "[i]n
no event will the public announcement of an adjournment or postponement
of a stockholders meeting commence a new time period (or extend any time
period) for the giving of a stockholder's notice as described above." The
conspicuous absence of similar language from [the corporation's] bylaw
suggests that [the bylaw] is at least ambiguous.
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Finding omitted language to constitute ambiguity represents a departure
from earlier decisions.305
Notwithstanding the shifts in Airgas and Sherwood, courts have
not fully abandoned the tendency to find language unambiguous in ways
that favor shareholder-plaintiffs. For example, in Hill International, Inc.
v. Opportunity Partners L.P., the Delaware Supreme Court upheld the
plaintiffs nominations holding that, as used in the applicable advance
notice bylaws, "the date" could only mean a specific day.3 06 The bylaws
required that shareholders submit nominations sixty to ninety days prior
to the annual meeting unless the notice or prior public disclosure "of the
date of the meeting" was given fewer than seventy days prior to the
meeting, in which case shareholders could submit proposals within ten
days of the announcement.30 7 Defendants announced that its 2015 meeting
would occur "on or about June 10" more than a year in advance but did
not announce the actual date of the meeting until April 30, and plaintiffs
submitted nominations on May 7.308 Finding the plaintiffs nominations
to be valid, the court held that the plain meaning of "the date" means a
specific day and thus only the April 30 announcement triggered the
advance notice bylaw. 3 Notably, unlike earlier decisions, the Hill Court
did not expressly consider what construction favored shareholder rights
when determining the bylaws' unambiguous meaning. 310
From the above we see how limited a role Blasius's "compelling
justification" standard has today, even in matters such as advance notice
bylaws that directly impact the voting franchise. Delaware courts have
instead substituted interpretative tools developed in the realm of contract
law with the natural effect of ignoring the larger question of the board's
authority to circumscribe the shareholder prerogatives. There appears to
be little of Blasius that remains.
VI. LIKELY CAUSES FOR DELAWARE'S RETREATS AND RECALIBRATIONS

Each of the decisions that comprise the Golden Quartet stands
substantially qualified today. The bulwark each initially erected against
Id.
305 See e.g., Levitt Corp. v. Office Depot, Inc., C.A. No. 3622-VCN, 2008 WL 1724244,
at *6 n.43 (Del. Ch. Apr. 14, 2008), reprinted in 33 DEL. J. CORP. L. 579 (holding that election
unambiguously includes nomination if a bylaw and Annual Meeting Notice do not define the
scope of "elect").
6 119 A.3d 30, 39 (Del. 2015).
' 0 Id. at 33-34.
08
Id. at 32-33.
3
9 Id. at 39, 40.
310
Id. at 38.
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overreaching managers, directors and control stockholders is more
penetrable today than when first built. Indeed, we believe that Revlon and
Weinberger are now relegated to being historical markers whose value is
to show from where the law has traveled. Even though defensive
maneuvers continue to be subjected to heighted scrutiny akin to selfinterested behavior in other areas, Unocal has faded in importance too as
the hostile takeover has become an increasingly endangered species.
Today, Blasius's sphere is so narrowly defined that its regulatory space is
miniscule, so that it can at best reach only the most egregious intrusions
on the shareholders' voting prerogatives. In this section, we examine
possible explanations for why the Golden Quartet's once uplifting prelude
has now become so flat.
A. Revlon: The Deal Litigation Explosion
As is true in other commercial areas, cries of a litigation explosion,
abuse of the judicial system and fears of lack of competitiveness in global
markets have political salience. Nearly all the retrenchments and
qualifications reviewed above coincided with a dramatic and very public
upswing in the incidence of deal litigation. Such class action suits are
customarily brought on behalf of the shareholders of the acquired firm and
allege a range of misconduct, such as the target company board failing to
obtain a better price, or directors making disclosure violations in seeking
stockholder approval. Corporate law is not immune to such concern.
Considering that in 1999 and 2000 around 10% of deals produced
litigation.' In that era most of the deal litigation not only involved
Delaware firms but also took place in Delaware.3 12 Suits in that era were
consequential because firms that were sued experienced a statistically
significant higher incidence of deals that did not close, while litigated
deals that closed yielded their shareholders increased returns. Hence, the
deal-focused suits in that former era could be seen, on the whole, as
positive.
Times have since changed. Beginning in 2009, there was a
significant increase in the percentage of deals being challenged by
shareholder litigation. Many of these cases were filed not only in
Delaware, but also in other jurisdictions, leading to a big jump in the
volume of multi-jurisdictional litigation. One study found that by 2013:
(1) a very high percentage of large M&A transactions were subjected to
litigation, reaching 96% of deals; (2) over three-quarters of those cases
311 C.N.V. Krishnan, et al., ShareholderLitigation in Mergers and Acquisitions, 18 J.
CORP. FIN.
3 12 1248, 1250-54 (2012).
1 d. at 1251.
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resulted in settlements and over three-quarters of those settlements were
disclosure-only settlements; and (3) median attorneys' fees awards in the
disclosure only settlements reached $450,000, which while substantial in
itself, was less than 20% of the fee awards in substantive settlements.313
Fear that such litigation is not driven by merits, but rather by the
quest for a quick settlement, is fed by a study finding no correlation
between the premium shareholders receive as a consequence of the merger
and the likelihood of there being a fiduciary class action claim.3 14 The
supposition is that shareholders sue when they believe they are not
receiving a fair price for their shares due to the board's misconduct; a
merger that produces a handsome premium would thus be less likely to
prompt complaint.
Concern that the merits are not driving such deal litigation is the
focus of a study by Professors Jill E. Fisch, Sean J. Griffith & Steven
Davidoff Solomon." They reviewed 453 firms during the period 20052012, of which 319 experienced litigation and resulted in 191 transactions
involving the above-type of remedy. 16 The authors examined three types
of relief flowing from challenged mergers: (1) amendment of the terms of
the merger agreement, (2) disclosure only settlement, and (3) increase in
They found amendment settlements and
merger consideration.3 17
disclosure only settlements do not have an impact on ultimate shareholder
vote and there is only weak evidence that an increase in consideration
impacts the shareholder vote. 1 They also tested other variables, finding
that transaction value and position of proxy advisors had significant
effect.319
In response to this deluge, the Delaware courts and the General
Assembly took action. In 2015, the Delaware General Assembly approved
amendments to the DGCL to permit Delaware corporations to adopt forum
selection bylaws. 32 0 These bylaws could be approved by directors without
313 Cain, et al, supra note 9, at tables 2, 3.

Another study similarly reported that 93
percent of acquisitions in excess of$100 million attracted at least one fiduciary duty class action
in 2012. ROBERT M. DAINEs & OLGA KOUMRIAN, CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SHAREHOLDER
LITIGATION INVOLVING MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS (2013).
314 See Charles R. Korsmo & Minor Myers, The Structure of Stockholder Litigation:

When Do the Merits Matter?, 75 OHIO ST. L. J. 829, 836, 876-77 (2014).
315 Jill E. Fisch et al., Confronting the PeppercornSettlement in Merger Litigation: An
EmpiricalAnalysis andA ProposalforReform, 93 TEX. L. REV. 557 (2015).
316
Id. at 579.
317
Id. at 56(0-61.
31
1Id. at 56 1.
"9 Id. at 582.
320 S.B. 75, 148th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Del. 2015) (enacted) (amending the DGCL
to prohibit fee shifting provisions in bylaws or articles of incorporation (codified as amended at
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shareholder consent.
They permitted corporate boards to force
shareholder litigation into the Delaware Court of Chancery for resolution.
Within a year, they had been widely adopted by companies as a potential
solution to the multijurisdictional litigation problem. More recently, in
response to what was believed to be too aggressive a use of appraisal,
Delaware amended its appraisal statute to require petitioners seeking
appraisal of publicly traded shares to own one percent of the outstanding
shares. 32 1
The Delaware courts also responded to widely-held concerns of
abusive litigation. Disclosure-only settlements recently garnered special
attention by Chancellor Bouchard in In re Trulia, Inc. Stockholder
3 22
Litigation.
The complaint in In re Trulia alleged that the directors
breached their fiduciary duties in approving a merger with a single bidder
that allegedly failed to obtain the highest exchange ratio for the
shareholders.32 3 Soon after the complaint was filed, an agreement was
reached that the company would make several supplemental disclosures to
its proxy statement and that the company would not oppose a fee request
that did not exceed $375,000.324 In return, the plaintiff class broadly
released any claims that could conceivably arise from the merger (except
such claims that may have existed under specified antitrust laws). 3 25 The
merger was ultimately approved by 79.52 percent of the shares entitled to
vote (99.15 percent of the votes cast).326 Following the merger's
completion, the parties sought approval of the settlement.
Chancellor Bouchard closely examined the supplementary
disclosures, each of which dealt with distinct features of the valuation
process used by the investment bank in its fairness opinion to the board.327
He concluded they were not meaningful in light of all the other
information the company disclosed regarding the valuation process.328
Because he did not believe the settlement produced any benefit, he rejected
the settlement and therefore left the suit where it had started, a pending
bald accusation of breach of fiduciary obligation. 32 9 He went on to say:

DEL. CODE. tit. 8, §§ 102, 109) and to authorize forum selection bylaw provisions (codified as
amended at DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 115)).
321 See Jiang, et al., supra note 151 (reviewing the new provisions that condition
appraisal on the petitioner holding either 1% or $1 million of the company's shares).
322 129 A3d 884 (Del. Ch. 2016).
323 Id. at 888.
324
Id. at 888-90.
325 id.
326

Id.
Id.
328
Id.
329
Id.
327

at 889.
at 900.
at 896-97.
at 907.
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[D]isclosure settlements are likely to be met with continued
disfavor in the future unless the supplemental disclosures
address a plainly material misrepresentation or omission, and
the subject matter of the proposed release is narrowly
circumscribed to encompass nothing more than the disclosure
claims and fiduciary duty claims concerning the sale, if the
record shows that such claims have been investigated
sufficiently. In using the term "plainly material," I mean that
it should not be a close call that the supplemental information
is material as that term is defined under Delaware law. Where
the supplemental information is not material, it may be
appropriate for the Court to appoint an amicus curiaeto assess
the Court in its evaluation of the alleged benefits of the
supplemental disclosures given the challenges posed by the
non-adversarial nature of the typical disclosure settlement
hearing.330
Coupled with the widespread adoption of forum selection bylaws,
In re Trulia had a devastating impact on shareholder litigation in
Delaware. By 2016, there had been a sharp drop in the percentage of deals
being challenged by shareholders, an increase in the percentage of deal
lawsuits that were dismissed by the Delaware courts, a concurrent large
drop in the number of such suits that were settled, significant drops in
attorneys' fee awards that were approved by the Delaware courts, and a
rapid shift in deal litigation filings out of Delaware and into the federal
courts.33 ' Each of these seems well-connected to In re Trulia's holding.

We note that one effect of In re Trulia can be seen as driving
litigation out of the Delaware state court system to forums not adopting
such a skeptical view of disclosure only settlements. Such a migration is
not a welcome development for Delaware as the state's economy clearly
benefits from corporate litigation in its courts as one of the bases for its
lucrative legal practice. The twin antidotes for this are the wide adoption
of forum selection clauses and altering legal doctrine. If litigation is to
occur, per a forum selection clause the defendant corporation's board can
select a forum informed by In re Trulia. And, so as not to drive off the
lucrative incorporation and advisement business elsewhere, Delaware's
doctrines, such as Revlon, have been tweaked to moderate the Golden
Quartet so that they place much more limited litigation targets on common
transactions. However, we believe there are many other explanations for
the changes that have occurred to the Golden Quartet.
330

Id. at 898-99.

331 Cai, et al., supranote 9, at 608-609.
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Delaware's retreat from Revlon can be understood as righting a legal
doctrine that had listed dangerously against the public interest in view of
the contemporary concern that shareholder litigation attending
acquisitions had reached a near epidemic scale. That is, Revlon's journey,
as recounted above, may well reflect the pitfalls that arise with establishing
a novel doctrine, e.g., the directors' mission is to pursue an auction of the
firm in certain instances, instead of simply invoking a conventional
approach to a problem, proscribing self-interested conduct. The peril of
adopting a new standard for conduct is the inherent uncertainty of how that
standard will be applied in later cases. This uncertainty is necessarily great
where courts eschew a well-worn path and proceed to blaze a new trail.
Revlon was just such a case. As observed earlier, Revlon's suitor
was Pantry Pride for whom Revlon had a distinct distaste.332 After
initiating a series of aggressive defensive maneuvers, the board opted for
a friendly acquisition by Forstmann Little.333 This posed classic selfdealing problems as Revlon's senior management used funds from their
lavish golden parachutes to become owners in the entity to acquire
Revlon.334 To facilitate Forstmann Little's financing the transaction,
Revlon's board waived the note covenants restricting Revlon and any
successor from incurring additional debt; the notes had been issued just a
few weeks earlier and upon announcement of the waiver of the protective
covenants the value of the notes declined substantially.335 The note
holders sued the Revlon directors alleging they had not disclosed that they
would seek a white knight and likely waive the protective covenants.336
Further self-dealing occurred when Revlon management withdrew from
participating in a buyout, but simultaneously granted Forstmann Little a
deal-ending lockup option with no material change in the price offered for
Revlon shares. 33 7 Transparently they made these changes in exchange for
Forstmann Little agreeing to support the price of the notes (thereby
shielding Revlon's board from an otherwise viable securities fraud class
action).33 8 Whether or not the Revlon board acted as auctioneers, their
conduct reeked of garden-variety self-interested conduct.
Instead of pursuing well-established doctrines developed for selfinterested misconduct, the Delaware Supreme Court embraced a very new,
but ill-defined, doctrine. The doctrine on its face appears innocuous
enough, namely that the directors when selling control should take steps
332 Revlon, Inc. v. Macandrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 175 (Del. 1986).
333 Id.
3

Id.
Id.
336
1d
337
Id.
33
1Id.
335

at 178.
at 179.
at 183.
at 178.

at 178-79.
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to garner the best offer for the shareholders. 339 Revlon is celebrated for
installing the directors' affirmative role as auctioneer in those limited
instances when there is a sale of control. We might puzzle whether the
auctioneer paradigm is the pervasive North Star that guides director
behavior on a wide range of matters they might address. This anointment
is all the more curious in the post-Revlon rhetoric, such as C&J Energy
Services, where the court observes that Revlon does not call for perfection
as an auctioneer but that the directors merely take steps they reasonably
believe consistent with a passive auction.340 What is odd about this
formulation is whether it says anything about what the directors' mission
is outside sales of control. If the board undertakes to dispose of a
subsidiary, a division, or a single piece of real estate, there is reason to
believe the formulation of the board's duty, or its expectations for those
carrying out the task, would not be at odds with processes contemplated
by Revlon. If this is so, what then is introduced by Revlon?
What changed in Revlon is the burden of proving reasonable action
consistent with the directors' wealth-maximizing North Star. This is of
course a very plaintiff friendly standard. That standard has since become
much less formidable, as Lyondell illustrates, with the wide adoption of
immunity shields whereby today the Revlon complaint must allege more
than directorial bumbling or somnolence. Revlon's facts today would most
assuredly be unaffected by an immunity shield; in today's legal
environment, single bidder cases are unlikely to prevail.
Thus,
developments such as C&JEnergy Services and Corwin are unsurprising
returns to the bedrock of corporate law. We might therefore see the
practical effect of both decisions as cabining Revlon to self-dealing and
self-interested acquisitions similar to Revlon itself, rather than installing a
new over-arching guide for directors.
Corwin likely also reflects the Delaware courts' increasing comfort
with both the sophistication of public shareholders and the efficient
operation of securities markets. 341 As quoted earlier, Corwin eagerly
elevated the non-judicial scrutiny of a fully-informed non-coercive
shareholder vote to supplant an ad hoc heightened judicial scrutiny. This
predisposition toward non-judicial mechanisms is evident in C&J Energy
Services, where the court concluded the board had met the auctioneering
model by a sufficiently delayed closing and only mild deal protective
339

Id. at 180.

3 C&J Energy Servs. v. City of Miami Gen. Emps.' & Sanitation Emps.' Ret. Tr., 107
A.3d 1049, 1067 (Del. 2014) (en banc).
341 J. Travis Laster, ChangingAttitudes: The Stark Results of Thirty Years of Evolution
in Delaware M&A Litigation, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON REPRESENTATIVE SHAREHOLDER

LITIGATION, 39-45 (forthcoming).
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measures so that if the bid in hand was inadequate the court believed this
would be corrected by another bidder stepping forward.
This
predisposition required faith that there was indeed a dynamic trading
market in which control could be transferred.
Further evidence of the prevailing faith in capital markets is the
recent holding in DFC Global Corp. v. Muirfield Value Partners, L.P.,
where the Delaware Supreme Court scolded the trial court for assigning in
an appraisal proceeding only one-third weight to a public company's
market price.342 Instead the court found that the deal price should be
accorded a strong presumption of being fair value in light of the faith that
could be accorded freely established market prices.

3 43

In sum, neither Corwin's nor C&J Energy Service's approaches
would have much salience except in a world which public ownership and
trading are dominated by sophisticated institutional investors. Thirty years
after Revlon there is a deep appreciation that public markets are
institutional markets, but this was not the case when the Golden Quartet
was decided. Thus, the growing and hence rising role of powerful
institutional shareholders has also has contributed significantly to changes
in Revlon.
B. Weinberger: Finishingthe Portrait
While the deal litigation explosion may have played a non-exclusive
role as well in the retreat from Weinberger, we offer a second, very
different, additional explanation of the Delaware court's retreat from
Weinberger and Lynch. M&F Worldwide may best be regarded as merely
completing the legal mosaic for the treatment of self-dealing acquisitions
for which most of the important pieces had already been laid in place.
Earlier Delaware Supreme Court holdings excused the controlling
stockholder from having to meet the entire fairness standard when
undertaking a cash tender offer for the minority's shares 344 and also when
the control was used to cash out the minority through a short-form
merger.34 5 The latter holding reasoned that by the General Assembly
providing a mechanism for anyone whose holdings are ninety percent or
more to effect a merger necessarily meant the transaction would not be
further conditioned on the transaction meeting the entire fairness test.
342 See DFC Global Corp. v. Muirfield Value Partners, L.P., 172 A.3d 346 (Del. 2017),
rev'g, In re Appraisal of DFC Global Corp., C.A. No. 10107-CB, 2016 WL 3753123 (Del. Ch.
July 8, 2016).
343
Id. at 388-89.
31 See Solomon v. Pathe Commc'ns. Corp., 672 A.2d 35 (Del. 1996).
345 See Glassman v. Unocal Exploration Corp., 777 A.2d 242 (Del. 2001).
3
Id. at 247.
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This logic set the stage for the Delaware General Assembly to amend the
DGCL by adding section 251(h) to authorize a "streamlined back-end
merger" procedure whereby a merger that quickly followed a friendly
tender offer, and accepted by at least of a majority of the shares, could be
put into effect without a shareholder vote.3 4 7 Moreover, the merger carried
out in the second step is not subject to an entire fairness inquiry. As
reasoned in In re Volcano Corp. Stockholder Litigation:
When a merger is consummated under Section 251(h), the
first-step tender offer essentially replicates a statutorily
required stockholder vote in favor of a merger in that both
require approval-albeit pursuant to different corporate
mechanisms-by stockholders representing at least a
majority of a corporation's outstanding shares to effectuate
the merger. A stockholder is no less exercising her "free and
informed chance to decide on the economic merits of a
transaction" simply by virtue of accepting a tender offer rather
than casting a vote. And, judges are just as "poorly positioned
to evaluate the wisdom of" stockholder-approved mergers
under Section 251(h) as they are in the context of corporate
transactions with statutorily required stockholder votes ....

I conclude that the acceptance of a first-step tender offer by
fully informed, disinterested, uncoerced stockholders
representing a majority of a corporation's outstanding shares
in a two-step merger under Section 251(h) has the same
cleansing effect .

.

. as a vote in favor of a merger by a fully

informed, disinterested, uncoerced stockholder majority.348
Each of these developments reflect the reasoning advanced in cases
such as In re Pure Resources, Inc. Shareholders Litigation, where the
court held that the entire fairness standard did not apply to any part of a
two-step transaction undertaken by a controlling stockholder whereby a
cash out merger follows its tender offer; provided both transactions occur

3'DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 251(h).
4 143 A.3d 727, 744-47 (Del. Ch. 2016), aff'dsub nom. Lax v. Goldman, Sachs & Co.,
156 A.3d 697 (Del. 2017) (unpublished table decision).
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close in time, at the same price, a majority of the independent shareholders
accept the tender offer, and there is no coercion or retributive threats. 34 9
More generally, we might well view developments such as M&F
Worldwide being the fairly straight-forward adherence to the Delaware
General Assembly's long-established template for addressing self-dealing
transactions.350 In Delaware, consistent with approaches taken in other
states, a transaction that involves a conflict of interest between a
corporation and its officers or directors is regulated by statute. 5 In broad
overview, the presumption of the business judgment rule disappears when
there is a transaction between the corporation and an officer or director;
however, pursuant to section 144, good faith approval by either nonconflicted directors or the shareholders, following full disclosure, restores
the protective presumption of the business judgment rule.352 Indeed, when
compared to this provision, M&F Worldwide is more demanding in its
requirements than how the Delaware General Assembly addresses conflict
of interest transactions by a company's officers or directors.353 M&F
Worldwide conditions restoration of the business judgment rule on both
board and shareholder action being independent; whereas section 144
restores the business judgment rule upon approval by either body.354
But the analogy to section 144 may be less than perfect because a
controlling stockholder's influence can be expected to be greater than that
of say a senior officer, or even a particular group of directors, so that
something more than the traditional procedures for addressing a director
or officer's conflict of interest are required. In any case, M&F Worldwide
appears very consistent with Delaware's overall approach in other contexts
where an acquisition is challenged on the ground of being a conflict of
interest with a dominant stockholder and is also consistent with the more
particularized officer or director conflict of interest expressly addressed by
the DGCL. The refinements to Weinberger are thus unexceptional in that
they reflect judicial and statutory developments that have opted for
governance processes over ad hoc entire fairness adjudications.

' 808 A.2d 421, 445-46 (Del. Ch. 2002).
For a skeptical view of the value of the majority of the minority vote in a control
shareholder squeeze-out, see Edward B. Rock, MOM's Approval in a World of Activist
Shareholders(Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper 2017, at 15). Zohar Goshen offers a
much more positive perspective in Zohar Goshen, The Efficiency of Controlling CorporateSelfDealing: Theory Meets Reality, 91 CALIF. L. REv. 393, 402 (2003).
335 See DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 144.
2
350

id.

353 Kahn v. M&F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635, 644-45 (Del. 2014).
3 Compare, id. at 644 with DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 144.
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C. Unocal's IncreasingIrrelevance
It is not easy to judge whether Time, Inc. or Unitrin had the biggest
limiting effect on Unocal's impact on board discretion. We believe that
the Delaware Supreme Court, by broadening the range of items that can
pose a threat in Time, Inc., fundamentally changed the assessment of
defensive maneuvers. Threats that management claims are coercive, or
offered too little money, can be better assessed pursuant to a
proportionality standard that existed pre-Time, Inc. But once threats were
changed to existing or proposed business practices or policies, there is
hardly any space between that inquiry and the traditional realm of the
business judgment rule. All that distinguishes the debate whether
management's policies or practices constitute waste, and whether
shareholder value would be enhanced by policies or practices that would
follow a change of control, is the specter of self-interest in the latter. Thus,
the real bite of Unocal-Unitrinis the imposition of a heightened scrutiny
standard that Delaware has regularly applied in situations rife with the
possibility of self-interested behavior; but it's an inquiry guided by a
standard that heavily favors the target board.
The Delaware Supreme Court's movement of Unocal in the
direction of the traditional deferential business judgment rule inquiry may
also be explained by the courts growing comfort with the level of
sophistication of the shareholder base with the rise of institutional
investors. Similar to the reasoning in Corwin, shareholder voice to
ultimately mediate whether there should be a change of control can be seen
preferable to ex-post judicial interference. Delaware's deference to the
ballot box and the proxy contest, as opposed to the tender offer, appears to
be a clear illustration of this thinking.355
If this is what is occurring, and we believe it is, then the Delaware
courts appear to be accommodating the activist shareholder movement. As
aggressive tactics of putting the "odor of money" in the air to gain control
have become pass6, activist investors have sought to increase shareholder
value via a variety of tactics short of the hostile tender offer. These tactics
range from communicating with management or seeking board
representation after a friendly request, to more hostile techniques such as
making a shareholder proposal or publicly criticizing target

" This deference is apparent in both Selectica and Airgas where the Delaware courts
found that the combination of the poison pill and the classified board is not preclusive under the
Unocal test. See Versata Enters. v. Selectica, 5 A.3d 586, 604 (Del. 2010); Air Prods. and
Chems., Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., 16 A.3d 48 (Del. Ch. 2011).
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management.356 If none of these opening gambits produces the desired
result, the hedge fund may threaten/bring a proxy contest, threaten/sue the
company's board of directors, or seek to force a change of control
transaction of the targeted company, such as a sale to a friendly third
party.' Aggressiveness matters as in the post-financial crisis world the
most aggressive hedge funds have been the most successful amongst
them.358
Unocal is poorly suited to mediate the changing dynamics that
accompanies the fray between the activist fund and management. For one
thing, traditional antitakeover defenses such as the classified board and the
poison pill are ineffective against most hedge fund interventions. For
example, poison pills are largely ineffective because their trigger levels
are for the most part set at a minimum of 10%,359 which usually exceeds
the amount held by an activist hedge fund (median level around 6 to
7%).36 Classified boards, which combined with the poison pill are lethal
to hostile tender offers, have little impact on hedge funds since if the funds
choose to run a proxy contest, they invariably seek only a minority of the
board seats that are up for election using a so-called short slate contest.
Situations where corporate management is resisting a counselled
course of action while continuing to engage the activist investor would
appear to fall outside Unocal and well within the protective ambit of the
business judgment rule. As activists eschew the hostile takeover model,
and resort to other mechanisms to engage management, there would seem
to be less need for resort to Unocal. We thus believe there is a strong
connection between the declining frequency of hostile takeovers, and the
weakening of Unocal, namely the ubiquity of the poison pill. The proxy
contest, and not the tender offer, is the vehicle for changing the firm's
direction and, as seen above, this shifts the role of courts to the more
deferential business judgment rule paradigm.
D. Blasius's FrustratedPromise
Within the Golden Quartet, Blasius harbored the greatest potential
for profound change in well-entrenched corporate law doctrines. Where
35
357

Bray, et al., supra note 8, at 1743-46.
Id.

. See C.N.V. Krishnan, et al., The Second Wave of Hedge Fund Activism: The
Importance ofReputation, Clout and Expertise, 40 J. CORP. FRN. 296, 300 (2016) (showing that
hedge funds that take largest positions in target firms and engage in most aggressive forms of
activism have been the most successful funds in the post-financial crisis time period).
. An exception for NOL pills was blessed by the Delaware Supreme Court in Versata
Enters. v. Selectica, Inc., 5 A.3d 586, 606 (Del. 2010).
'6 Bray et al, supranote 8, at 1747.
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the other cases dealt with particularized standards to be met in their
respective arenas-sale of control, self-dealing acquisitions and defensive
maneuvers-Blasius articulated a high standard of review with the
consequent effect of substantially limiting the areas in which boards may
act without meeting the substantial burden of establishing a compelling
justification to do S0.361 Revlon permitted directors to transfer control so
long as their conduct in doing so was consistent with getting the best
offer. 362 Similarly self-dealing acquisitions could proceed subject to an
entire fairness inquiry. 363 And control could be defended under even
Unocal so long as the defensive measure was deemed proportional. M But
Blasius conditioned director actions that thwarted shareholders exercising
their limited prerogatives on a much higher showing of reasons for their
interdiction.36 5 We therefore conclude that Blasius's early containment is
responsive to the great promise it provided to strengthen the rights of
stockholders. Had Blasius not been cabined, a wide array of practices
common today would not be permissible without stockholder approval.
This we believe explains Delaware's retreat from Blasius. That is, its
reach called not only for a wholesale reexamination of many established
areas of corporate law but they were areas central to any adjustment in
doctrine that would necessarily weaken the prerogatives of management.
Consider how the poison pill interferes with shareholders' freedom
to sell their shares. Central to every poison pill is the financially disastrous
consequences for the bidder whose share purchases do not conform to the
limits set forth in the poison pill. This necessarily, indeed intentionally, is
for the purpose of removing from the target company's shareholders the
opportunity to sell shares at a price they believe advantageous. Were
Blasius to apply, the company's board of directors would have to
demonstrate a compelling justification for not redeeming the firm's rights
to thereby enable shareholders to consider the bidder's offer. 3" This
inquiry very much has resonance with Chancellor Allen's consideration,
discussed earlier, of the Interco board's refusal to redeem its outstanding
pill.3 67 And, unlike Unocal-Unitrin'sfocus on whether not redeeming the
pill is preclusive or coercive, the board's decision not to redeem the pill
" See Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A2d 651 (Del. Ch. 1988).

362 Revlon v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holding, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 185 (Del. 1986).
363 Id.
3

Id.
36 Blasius Indus., Inc., 564 A.2d at 663.
3 With one exception, poison pills have not been vulnerable to Blasius because
shareholders can exercise their right to change the board's composition by voting; the exception
to this escape is the dead-hand poison pill. See Carmody v. Toll Bros., 723 A.2d 1180, 1193
(Del. Ch. 1998) ("[T~he 'dead hand' provision purposefully interferes with the shareholder
without any compelling justification, and is therefore unlawful under Blasius.").
voting franchise
36
1 See supra, Part.EI.B.
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would be tested, as the Atlas board's actions were, by whether there was a
compelling justification to thwart further shareholder sales because doing
so would have been in their interest. An argument by the target board that
the pill is necessary to protect the shareholders from accepting too low a
price is counter to respecting the shareholder franchise that envisions the
right of shareholders to make that decision individually. Moreover, it is
counter to what occurs outside of the change of control context, namely
shareholders are accorded the right to sell at prices they believe sufficient
for the transaction. Just why should that right be qualified in the change
of control context? Blasius's great hope was to open this area to analysis
so that much needed insight could be developed on the purpose and
content of the shareholder franchise to sell. Regrettably, the Delaware
courts have quickly, and without analysis, closed this area for thoughtful
analysis.
Another component of the shareholder franchise is shareholders'
power to sue managers for their misconduct. Such suits regularly occur
either as individual claims or derivative claims. This component of the
shareholder franchise now is deeply qualified in Delaware as a result of
recent Delaware decisions.
The Delaware Court of Chancery in
Boilermakers Local 154 Retirement Fund v. Chevron Corp. held that the
board could unilaterally adopt a bylaw that permitted the corporation to
choose the forum in which a shareholder-initiated suit would be
maintained. 368 The Boilermakers Court reasoned that a corporation's
bylaws are part of the web of relationships within the modem corporation
that form the "contract" shareholders have with their corporation, so that
the board's authority to amend the bylaws conveys on the board the power
to at least qualify, if not alter, the shareholders' rights. 36 9 Shortly after
Boilermakers, the Delaware Supreme Court employed similar reasoning
in A TP Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund,370 to uphold a board-adopted
bylaw that abandoned the long-maintained American Rule (whereby each
litigant bears her own litigation costs) to instead assign the suit's
defendant's expenses to the plaintiff if the suit proved unsuccessful.3 71 It
is easy to imagine a range of other ways that the bylaws could qualify or
73 A.3d 934, 939-41 (Del. Ch. 2013).
MId. at 958.
370 91 A.3d 554, 557-58 (Del. 2014) (en banc).
371 Since these decisions, the Delaware General Assembly has Solomon-like
entered the
area expressly authorizing forum-selection bylaws such as the one upheld in Boilermakers but
prohibiting any charter or bylaw provision that would shift fees to the unsuccessful plaintiff.
S.B. 75, 148th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Del. 2015) (enacted) (amending the DGCL to prohibit
fee shifting provisions in bylaws or articles of incorporation (codified as amended at DEL. CODE.
tit. 8, §§ 102, 109) and to authorize forum selection bylaw provisions (codified as amended at
DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 115)).
3

9
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eliminate shareholder litigation in the courts such as mandating suits occur
through arbitration.3 72 Were Blasius's reach not limited to the shareholder
franchise of voting, the board's power to unilaterally restrain or limit
shareholder suits would be subject to a "compelling justification" inquiry.
As seen earlier, the core of Blasius's holding is that corporate
statutes, while broadly enabling of the board of directors, nonetheless
assess the board's exercise of discretion differently when the board thwarts
an on-going exercise of a matter within the shareholders' franchise. So
understood, Blasius is affronted when the board unilaterally amends the
bylaws, as occurred in both Boilermakers and A TP Tour, to either qualify
or eliminate a right particular to the principal-agent relationship. Similar
affronts occur, as it does with the board's adoption of a poison pill, by
boards unilaterally acting to prevent the free transfer of shares to a bidder.
Thus, an undiluted Blasius would have viewed these developments not
through the lens of contracting, or even Unocal373 but rather whether the
unilateral action was supported by a compelling justification.
Simply stated, a general grant of authority to the board of directors
to adopt, amend, and repeal bylaws is a weak basis for concluding such
authority extends to altering the rights or protections shareholders
customarily enjoy. Just as the Atlas board could not have prevailed by
amending the bylaws to change the board's size without meeting the
compelling justification standard, the Atlas board should not be able
absent a compelling justification to amend the bylaws to condition any suit
thwarting the shareholder franchise to vote on that shareholder meeting
Each invades the
certain bylaw-mandated standing requirements.
shareholders' sphere as it is unrelated to "[t]he business and affairs of ...
[the] corporation"37 4 so that it cannot be viewed other than central to the
principal-agent relationship.
VII. CONCLUSION

Given the enormous changes that have occurred in the past thirty
years, it is not surprising that commentators have split over the
significance and value of these changes. In our view, there are reasons to
be concerned that private enforcement of director fiduciary duties has
spiraled out of control, but at the same time, it is important to remember
372 See e.g., Ann M. Lipton, Manufactured Consent: The Problem of Arbitration in
CorporateChartersand Bylaws, 104 GEo. L. J. 583 (2016).
"1 One of the authors of this paper has separately written that the board's unilateral
actions in this area cannot be justified under contract law. See Cox, supranote 10.
374 As prescribed by section 141(a) of the DGCL and other corporate statutes. See text
accompanying n.224, supra Part.IV.
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that the new cutbacks by the Delaware courts and the state's General
Assembly will weaken shareholder monitoring of corporate management
and potentially increase the incidence of director misconduct. We try to
take a middle road by acknowledging that the Delaware courts are
weakening shareholder oversight of directors' and officers' fiduciary
duties, while also recognizing the underlying motivations that prompted
them to relax their scrutiny of corporate management. We argue that the
reductions in shareholder monitoring associated with reduced levels of
private enforcement are offset by institutional shareholder activism,
improved market efficiency and especially increased hedge fund activism.
In corporate governance, shareholder monitoring can occur in a
variety of ways. In recent years, many hedge funds have engaged in
shareholder monitoring, often with the support of quieter institutional
investors. 37 5 They target undervalued firms that may be suffering from
poor management.376 The filing of an activist hedge fund's Schedule 13D
generates positive average abnormal returns from 7% to 8%.
While
hedge funds have critics who claim that they pursue short term gains at the
expense of long term profits, 7 8 they have strong supporters as well who
argue that they increase value in both the long and the short term.3 79
Whichever view one subscribes to, everyone agrees that hedge fund
activism has lit a fire under corporate managers and is subjecting their
every action to close investor scrutiny.
At present, the vitality of hedge fund activism provides a strong
force to keep corporate management strongly aligned with the interests of
investors so that other forms of monitoring, particularly expensive ones,
may be less important. However, we finish with a note of caution:
Delaware should be careful about restricting alternative forms of
monitoring, such as hedge fund activism, unless it is willing to restore
private enforcement actions via shareholder litigation as a means of
aggressive shareholder monitoring.

" Ronald Gilson & Jeffrey Gordon, The Agency Costs ofAgency Capitalism, Activist
Investors and Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113 COLUM. L. REv. 863 (2013); Paul H.
Edelman, Randall S. Thomas, & Robert B. Thompson, Shareholder Voting in an Age of
Intermediary Capitalism, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 1359 (2014).
376 Alon Bray et al., Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate Governance, and Firm
Performance, 63 J. FIN. 1729 (2008).
3
1n Id. at 1731.
371 Martin Lipton, Deconstructing American Business II, in DECONSTRUCTING
AMERICAN BUSINESS II AND SOME THOUGHTS FOR BOARDS OF DIRECTORS IN 2007 1 (National

Legal Center for Public Interest ed., 2006).
. Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth that InsulatingBoards Serves Short-Term Value, 113
COLUM. L. REV. 1637, 1637 (2013).

